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Abstract
The general progress of the Community toward increased “federalism” seems as persistent
and steady as it once was in the United States. That the Community elected another starting point,
and at times seems to travel a far different road, does not mean that the final destination is different
as well. Compare, for example, “federalism” in the United States and European Community in
just two areas that are hallmarks of central government policy: agriculture and taxation.
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INTRODUCTION: HOW IT BEGAN
While on sabbatical in 19911 to study the European Com-
munities, I began to query persons connected with, or with
" 
9What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet .. .
WILIAM SHAKESPFARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2, 11. 43-44.
•* Professor of Law, Dean Emeritus, New England School of Law.
1. I spent one term each at Cambridge, Exeter, and Edinburgh Universities. In
addition, I affiliated with the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the University of
London. In 1993, I extended that work through visits to'the Universities of Konstanz
and Mfinster, in Germany. Material for the article also derived from an address by the
author before the Annual Congress of the Trier Academy of European Law, The Future
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knowledge of, the European Community ("EC") about their
views and opinions concerning its "federalization." This is per-
fectly natural, I suppose, for Americans are fond of thinking that
if only we could export our form of "democracy" to every point
on the globe, the world would be a better place.
of Europe - Centralized and Decentralized Approaches (Oct. 7-8, 1993) (Trier Acad-
emy, forthcoming Spring 1994).
The list of persons to whom I am indebted is too long to recount in full here.
However, some individuals figure so strongly in the life of the project that they deserve
credit. I begin with my Dean,John F. O'Brien, and Board of Trustees, who gave me the
freedom, flexibility and support to pursue this work. At Cambridge, I was befriended by
Kurt Lipstein, Emeritus Professor of Law of Clare College. He became my informal
mentor and did everything within his power to guide my thinking aright. My College
president and University Vice-Chancellor, Sir David Williams, was a stimulating host,
and Vaugun Lowe (Corpus Christi) and Christopher Greenwood (Magdelene) were
unfailingly generous with their time and thoughts. The Director of the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies, Terence C. Daintith, and his colleague, Francis Snyder, both
European scholars, were also quite helpful. At Exeter University, John Usher, John
Bridge and David Parrott were accessible and reliable commentators. At Edinburgh,
Professors Robert Lane and Willy Patterson were especially helpful. Within the Com-
munity institutions, I would especially like to thank Lord Gordon Slynn of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, Judge Donal Barrington of the Court of First Instance, Francis
Jacobs, then Chief Advocate General of the Court, and Alan Dashwood, Director of
Legal Services of the European Council. Lawrence Collins, Esquire, of Herbert Smith,
Ltd., London, a learned commentator on Community affairs, was also quite generous
with his time.
I also thank Professors Werner F. Ebke and Kay Hailbronner of Konstanz and
Professors Bernhard Grossfeld and Otto Sandrock, Directors of the Institut ffir Interna-
tionales Wirtschaftsrecht, Mfinster, for the environment, stimulation and insights they
provided.
Finally, I am extremely grateful to two former research associates, Mary Crane and
Carol Teigue Thomas, and my current associate, Rachel Kaylie, for their research and
editorial assistance leading to this final article.
2. Personally, I am not convinced this is possible, let alone desirable. I am of the
opinion that a true democracy (even those of a highly republican form) can only suc-
ceed in environments where there are enough resources of every description to allow
those who control the resources to share them with others. Put aside "democratic tradi-
tion" or "experience." Where resources are scarce, the most "democratic" form of gov-
ernment (instrument of resource-distribution) that is possible is something more auto-
cratic. Under such conditions, that is the most natural form of government, for a true
democracy cannot thrive. The truth is, resources are scarce in much of the world, and
democracy, even when it has been established, is generally short-lived.
THE FEDERAUST No. 2, at 6 (John Jay) (Goldwin Smith ed., rev. ed., 1901) suggests
that the advent of a Federal Union in America might be the result of "Providence,"
which
blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered it with innumera-
ble streams .... A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round
its borders, as if to bind it together .... Providence has been pleased to give
this one connected country to one united people .... [So that] it appears as if
it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient
FEDERALISM IN THE EC AND THE US
Among the persons I interviewed was a bright legal counsel
at the European Commission's headquarters in Brussels. I
pressed him as hard as any interviewee about the process of "fed-
eralization" in the Community. Eventually, he turned my ques-
tion against me: he asked "at exactly what point in America's
history did it become a federation?" My answer was a little
hollow.
It is not easy to pick a precise point in time, because federal-
ization is a process and not an event. Surely, thirty-six years into
America's Constitutional history (the current age of the Euro-
pean Community), this country was far from a strong federal
union. In some ways, it was not as "federalized" as the Commu-
nity is today.
So, if we are to judge by the current American model, the
present confederal form of Community government is seriously
flawed; perhaps hopelessly so. However, if we were to judge the
European Community of today by the United States' original
form of federal government - not the Articles of Confedera-
tion, but the U.S. Constitution of 1789 - then the distinctions
are far less clear. When compared to our present, highly-central-
ized government, that early U.S. federation also was weak, and its
eventual success far from clear, as this article shows. What is
clear, however, is that other forms of federation or confedera-
tion3 than the American form can be highly successful; for exam-
ple, the successful relationship between the relatively-weak Swiss
central government and the cantons.4
for a band of brethren ... should never be split into a number of unsocial,
jealous, and alien sovereignties.
THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 6 (JohnJay) (Goldwin Smith ed., rev. ed., 1901).
This caused Professor Epstein to opine that
America's accidental advantages in choosing her own government suggest that
America can decide what societies of men are "really capable" of in only a
limited way. If we fail despite our very favorable circumstances, the conclusion
must be that men cannot establish government by reflection and choice. If we
succeed, our reliance on lucky accidents suggests that a similar choice will not
always or often be available to other societies of men.
DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 21 (1984).
3. See Alberta M. Sbragia, Thinking about the European Future: The Uses of Comparison,
in EUROPOLITICS 257 (A.M. Sbragia, ed., 1992). Professor Sbragia rather surgically ac-
counts for the differences between "federalism" and "confederalism" in terms of the
architecture of the union and the degree of sovereignty surrendered. Id. In this arti-
cle, I have adopted the interpretation that the difference between the two is a matter of
degree, not necessarily evidenced by specific requirements or forms.
4. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 311 (Gryphon ed. 1988).
1994]
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Be that as it may, the European Community's preoccupa-
tion with the correlation of its "federal" form to that of the
United States has intrigued many scholars,5 and continues right
up to the present day. Sometimes I think the whole inquiry is
entirely too dear.6 However, the confederation of the twelve
Member States of the European Community, and their zealous
pursuit of shared goals, sufficiently resembles the early U.S. ex-
perience, that many persons - scholars and world citizens alike
- are eager to learn how it will work out. After all, the Commu-
nity may prove to be the world's second-greatest experiment with
federalism.
The best short answer I can offer to the question I asked my
European friends is that European "federalism," while not en-
tirely like that of the United States in either conception or form,
can, in different instances, be both more and less federal than
ours. However, it surely is tending in the same direction as did
our "federalization" over the past 200 years, and for similar rea-
sons.
7
De Tocqueville wrote: "I should regard it as a great misfortune for mankind if liberty
were to exist, all over the world, under the same forms." Id.
5. See VOL. 1-3 MAURO CAPPELLETrI, MONICA SECCOMBE, AND JOSEPH WEILER, INTE-
GRATION THROUGH LAw: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (1985). [here-
inafter WEILER]. I found the attempted parallels in some of these articles "strained" and
not always relevant. See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND
AMERICA (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990); LuTz ROEMHELD, INTEGRAL FEDERALISM: MODEL FOR
EUROPE (1990);J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403 (1991).
The topic is more generally handled in surveys treating the European Community. See,
e.g., KURT LIPSTEIN, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1974);
NICHOLAS GREEN, TREVOR C. HARTLEY, AND JOHN A. USHER, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET (1991).
One quite good, though complex, article on the subject is: Koen Lenaerts, Some
Reflections on the Sparation of Powers in the European Community, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
11 (1991).
6. See Lenaerts, supra note 5, at 12-13. Lenaerts wrote that "an organic under-
standing of the separation of powers is not practicable in the European Community."
Id. There is no "clear-cut line between the legislative and executive branches of the
Community government." Id. But, he suggests, the comparison can be made if one
takes a functional approach. Id.
7. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (Goldwin Smith ed., rev. ed.,
1901). Madison wrote: "There are two methods of curing the mischief of faction: The
one, by removing its causes; the other, by controling (sic) its effects." Id. Could the
first goal be achieved by setting up a common economic market in Europe? And the
second by giving the European Court the exclusive power to interpret its laws?
[Vol. 17:389
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I. HOW MANY ROUTES TO "FEDERATION?"
A. The United States
It is clear that the United States and European "unions" had
somewhat different objectives from the start. Because of the
consensus failure of the Articles of Confederation' to stabilize
and protect the diverse, original thirteen American states, in
1787 their representatives undertook to establish a central gov-
ernment9 authorized to perform the functions typical of sover-
eign, national governments of the time. Those functions in-
cluded: raising and supporting armies; conducting foreign rela-
tions; printing money,; regulating commerce; and levying taxes.10
The latter power was shared with the states (each government in
its own sphere), but all of the other powers listed were to be the
exclusive province of the central government.
The stimulus to create the U.S. government was different
from that which produced the European Communities, for there
was external pressure upon the American colonies (now states)
to unite. Without unifying, the colonies could not compete, nor
effectively negotiate, with their stronger European counterparts.
The nation's obligations would find no takers if government
lacked authority to raise money to pay them. There was no abil-
ity to repel an invasion, should one come, without an army or
navy." This sense of urgency was dramatically represented in a
popular Revolutionary cartoon: 'Join or Die.' 2
However, The Federalist, which promoted ratification of the
new Constitution, with its centralized government, extolled its
8. THE FEDERAuST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).
9. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCrION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED STATES 3 (2d ed. 1983). In point of fact, the convention in Philadelphia that
eventually produced the Constitution of the United States was originally convened to
amend the Articles of Confederation, insofar as they made "no provision for a separate
national executive or judiciary" and gave the Confederation no power to tax, nor to
regulate commerce or the states. Id. However, these representatives had no wish to
"[obliterate] the states as constituent, [and] in some respects autonomous, parts of the
system." Id. Indeed, there was some dispute among the delegates regarding whether
they were authorized by their constituencies to draft an entirely new document. Id.
10. Id. at 4; see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 42, 44 (James Madison).
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).
12. See 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDiA AMERICANA 717 (Intl. ed. 1979). The cartoon, depict-
ing a sliced up snake, each section labeled with a state or region, appeared in several
versions, including one by Benjamin Franklin. Id.
1994]
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commercial benefits'" every bit as much as its security potential.
In this respect, the new union had objectives not unlike those of
the European Economic Community, some years later.'
4
While post-World War II Europeans arguably had a security
concern to motivate the formation of the European Coal and
Steel Community in 1951 (to forestall war among themselves
and as a buffer against the spread of Communism),' 5 it was not
as immediate or external as that of the fledgling United States;
unless it was running a poor third to the United States and Japan
in the global economic race. That is a rather abstract "threat" to
mobilize countries in such a revolutionary way.
But even America's central government was not immedi-
ately effective. Our notions of what the Constitution authorized
it to do have changed dramatically over the past 200 years, both
in terms of the relationship of the central government to the
"united" states and to their citizens.
For the most part, these changes were based on the felt
needs and circumstances of the moment. While the current
form of U.S. "federal" government resembles, in some respects,
the vision that was espoused in The Federalist,'6 in other ways it
13. See, e.g., THE FEDERAIJST Nos. 6, 8, 11 (Alexander Hamilton). The security
issue is principally addressed in number 3, while the prospect of avoiding war through
central government negotiation with foreign powers is considered mostly in number 4.
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3, 4 (John Jay).
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 at 110-11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Goldwin Smith ed.,
rev. ed.. 1901). "[T]here is no object [than the power to regulate commerce] .. .that
more strongly demands a Federal superintendence. The want of it has ... given occa-
sions of dissatisfaction between the states .... The interfering and unneighborly regula-
tions of some States [are] contrary to the true spirit of the Union .... " Id.
15. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1957,
261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty].
16. See THE FEDERAuST No. 2 at 5 (John Jay) (Goldwin Smith ed., rev. ed., 1901).
"Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government.., that when-
ever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights,
in order to vest it with [the] requisite powers". Id. "Commercial republics, like ours, will
never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They
will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and con-
cord." Id No. 6 at 24 (Alexander Hamilton) (Goldwin Smith ed., rev. ed., 1901).
"Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none de-
serves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the vio-
lence of faction .... Complaints are everywhere heard.., that our governments are too
unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties .... " Id.
No. 10 at 44 (James Madison) (Goldwin Smith ed., rev. ed., 1901). "[A] vigorous Na-
tional Government ... directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combina-
tions of European jealousy .... [B]ut in a state of disunion, these combinations might
1994] kEDERALISM IN THE EC AND THE US
now resembles the leviathan that those writings assured would
never come into being.17 As late as the 1830's, the writings of de
Tocqueville indicate that it is not entirely clear what powers the
central government would exercise vis-a-vis the constituent
states, or indeed whether the central government would eventu-
ally fulfill its raison d'etre, and cease'to have an important func-
tion.' 8 De Tocqueville 'is widely regarded as one of the most in-
exist and might operate with success." Id. No. 11 at 55, (Alexander Hamilton)
(Goldwin Smith ed., rev. ed., 1901).
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the
trade of each, by an interchange of their respective productions, not only for
the supply of reciprocal wants [at home], but for exportation to foreign mar-
kets .... When the staple of one fails... it can call to its aid the staple of
another. The variety... of products for exportation, contributes to the activ-
ity of foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms, with a
large number of materials.... [A] unity of commercial, as well as political
interests, can only result from [a] unity of government."
Id. at 56-57
17. See THE FEDERAusT No. 44 at 254-56 .(James Madison) (Goldwin Smith ed., rev.
ed., 1901).
[E] ach of the principal branches of the Federal Government will owe its exist-
ence more or less to the favor of the State Governments, and must conse-
quently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition
too obsequious, than too overbearing towards them .... The powers dele-
gated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments, are numerous
and indefinite."
Id.
If... the people should in future become more partial to the federal than the
State Governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresis-
tible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent
propensities .... [T]he prepossessions of the people, on whom both (govern-
ments] will depend, will be more on the side of State Governments ... "
Id. No. 45 at 259 (James Madison) (Goldwin Smith ed., rev. ed., 1901). "[Tihe States
will retain all preexisting authorities which may not be exclusively delegated to the Fed-
eral head.... " Id. No. 82 at 454 (Alexander Hamilton) (Goldwin Smith ed., rev. ed.,
1901).
18. DE TocQuEvuE, supra note 4, at 144-148.
As the sovereignty of the Union is limited and incomplete, its exercise is not
incompatible with liberty .... The'most prominent evil of all Federal systems
is the very complex nature of the means they employ. Two sovereignties are
necessarily in [the] presence of each other .... The Federal system therefore
rests upon a theory which is necessarily complicated . . . . When once the
general theory is comprehended, numerous difficulties remain to be solved in
its application; for the sovereignty of the Union is so involved in that of the
States, that it is impossible to distinguish its boundaries at the first glance.
[T] he most fatal of all the defects I have alluded to... inherent in the Federal
system, is the relative weakness of the Government of the Union. The princi-
ple upon which all confederations rest is that of a divided sovereignty ....
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sightful chroniclers of U.S. life during this period, but we know
today that he was quite wrong in this last assessment.
B. The European Community
In my meetings with European scholars and government
representatives, I am often amazed by their knowledge of U.S.
political and legal forms. Hence, I believe it is no mistake that
- with the American federal model clearly before them - the
original six Member States of the European Community decided
to delegate (rather than cede) to a central, supranational set of
institutions virtually none of the competencies that late 18th cen-
tury Americans felt it necessary to cede to a central government,
to insure their prosperity, and perhaps their very survival.
The Community has no central military force, although the
Western European Union might be the "beginning" of one, and
most Member States belong to NATO. Both of these organiza-
tions lie outside the Community treaties, however. The Commu-
nity's "foreign policy" is nominal at best, often confused, and no
substitute whatever for the individual Member States' foreign
policy initiatives, which continue today (except for economic
[But, whereas the] sovereignty of the Union is an abstract (thing] ... the sover-
eignty of the States is hourly perceptible...."
Id.
[But] if the present confederation were dissolved, it appears to me to be incon-
testable that the States of which it is now composed would not return to their
original isolated condition .... There are some objects [of legislation] which
are national by their very nature .... There are other objects which are pro-
vincial by their very nature .... Lastly, there are certain objects of a mixed
nature .... The Government of the Union watches the general interests of the
country ....
Id. at 362-65.
"In America the existing Union is advantageous to all the States, but it is not indis-
pensable to any one of them .... [T]he present Union will only last as long as the States
which compose it choose to continue members of the confederation." Id. at 368-69.
"The greater the individual weakness of each of the contracting parties, the greater are
the chances of the duration of the contract; for their safety is then dependent upon
their union." I& at 376.
"I think that the Federal Government is visibly losing strength .... Federal power
soon reached the maximum of its authority, as is usually the case with a government
which triumphs .... It was [its] very prosperity which made the Americans forget the
cause to which it was attributable. Id. at 384-86. I am strangely mistaken, if the [U.S.]
Federal Government... be not constantly losing strength ... and narrowing its circle of
action more and more .... [The] Government of the Union will grow weaker and
weaker every day." Id. at 394.
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treaties like GATT, EFTA (now EEA)2 ° and Lome21 ).2" This is
quite unlike the complete cession of foreign policy prerogative
by the states to the central government in the U.S. Constitu-
tion. 3
The Community has no real authority to raise taxes without
the approval of the Member States, and the size of the Commu-
nity budget is small when compared to that of larger Member
States.24 Moreover, the redistributive effect of the dispersal of
Community monies is extremely modest.
Hence, of all the hallmarks of American federalism con-
tained in the Constitution, only the regulation of commerce is
common to the two experiments in federalism.25 But the power
19. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
(1948) [hereinafter GATT].
20. European Economic Area Agreement, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 921.
21. Lome Convention and Final Act, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990).
22. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 228, Mar. 25,
1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-1I), 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 90 (1958) [hereinafter
EEC Treaty]. Article 228 reads, in relevant part:
[1] Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the
Community and one or more States or an international organization, such
agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. [Although, depending
upon the "powers vested" in it, the agreements must be "concluded" by the
Council, after consulting with the European Parliament]. [2] Agreements con-
cluded under these conditions shall be binding on the institutions of the Com-
munity and on Member States."
Id.; see also Bresciani v. Amministrazione delle Finanze, Case 87/75, [1975] E.C.R. 129,
[1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 62 (holding state could not impose health inspection fee on importer
on ground that inspection cost should be borne by public); Hamptzollant Mainz v.
Kupferberg, Case 104/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3641, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 1 (upholding effect of
EEC-Portugal trade agreement provision disallowing discrimination between Commu-
nity and Portuguese products).
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part:
"No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation" and "No State shall,
without the Consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with an-
other State, or with a foreign Power.. .. " Id.
24. See Court of Auditors Annual Report, Oj. C 324/1 (1991). In 1990, the
budget for the European Communities was approximately U.S.$61 billion, and they
employed approximately 24,700 persons in the various institutions (conversion used:
U.S.$1.3 = 1 ECU). Id. at 48. By contrast, the reunified German government, in 1991,
employed about 852,000 civil servants (exclusive of railroad and postal personnel) and
had expenditures of DM971 billion.(U.S.$588.5 billion). [Iam indebted tojochen Artz-
inger-Bolten, a student associated with the Institut ffr Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht
at the University of Minster, Germany, for assisting me with the German research
above. Telephone Interview with Federal Republic of Germany, Department of Civil
Service, Bonn, Germany (July 12, 1993)].
25. See THE FEDERALiST No. 16 at 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Goldwin Smith ed.,
rev. ed., 1901). Hamilton suggested that the authority of the central government can-
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to regulate commerce is no small power, and in this area the
Community often regulates undertakings in ways that are at least
as federal as the United States.
II. "FEDERALISM" IN THE EC COMPARED TO THE U.S.
Depending upon the issue, often at least one Member State
will demur from any direct or speedy course toward federalism.2"
To cite just a few examples: the first Danish referendum re-
jecting the Maastricht Treaty;27 Italy's reluctant transposition of
EC directives;2" the British and Italian withdrawal from the Euro-
pean Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM);29 and the French insis-
not rest on the whim of its Member States, but must come from "the persons of the
citizens," and be directly enforceable. Id. But in No. 17, Hamilton writes, in response
to those who worry that the Union will be "too powerful," that "[it will always be far
more easy for the state governments to encroach upon the national authorities, than
for the national government to encroach upon the state authorities." Id. No. 17 at 86
(Alexander Hamilton) (Goldwin Smith ed., rev. ed., 1901). The reason for this is that
"[it is a known fact in human nature that its affections are commonly weak in propor-
tion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object." Id. In the United States this no
longer seems to be the case, while in the European Community it still is.
26. See Bernhard Grossfeld, The Internal Dynamics of the European Community Law, 26
Irr'L LAw. 125, 126 (1992). To one accustomed to the U.S. system of "federal" law, this
must seem a terribly slothful manner of proceeding. For the moment, it is probably
politically necessary. Professor Grossfeld states that "[h]armonization, not unification, is
the aim [of the Community]." Id. Yet he allows that Community law "[goes] right into
the center of European legal cultures." Id.; see alsoJean Thieffry, Philip Van Doom and
Simon Lowe, The Single European Market: A Practitioner's Guide to 1992, 12 B.C. INT'L &
CoMP. L. Ruv. 357, 365 (1989). "Eighteen years of experience showed that the method
of attempting harmonization by means of detailed technical specifications [essentially
Community regulations] resulted in slow and difficult adoption procedures. For this
reason, in 1985 the Commission adopted a new approach... [chiefly the use of direc-
tives] . . . ." Id.
[D]irectives . . . set forth the essential norms [to be achieved, while leaving
much of the detail to individual Member States' legislation. Even using this
approach] . . . competent organs ... such as the European Normalization
Committee, have the task of elaborating the technical specifications which
professionals will need to adopt in order to comply with the directive.
Id. at 365-66. These authors admit that progress in many Community market areas
remains slow and grudging. One concludes that, at some point in time, the Community
will have to resort again to the use of regulations in order to achieve the efficiency that
an economy of its magnitude requires to be competitive.
27. See Jonathan Kaufman, Full of Sound and Fury; But Europe's Currency Crisis May
Signify Very Little, BosTrON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 1993, at 61 (noting Danish rejection of Maas-
tricht Treaty as start of public debate on European unity).
28. See Privatization Comes to Italy, WASH. TiMs, July 20, 1992, at E2 (noting Italy's
common failure to implement EEC economic directives).
29. See Ray Moseley, European Unity Loses Currency, Monetaty Overhaul May Lift Econo-
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tence on a protective agricultural policy."0
In spite of these problems, however, the general progress of
the Community toward increased "federalism" seems as persis-
tent and steady as it once was in the United States. That the
Community elected another starting point, and at times seems to
travel a far different road, does not mean that the final destina-
tion is different as well. Compare, for example, "federalism" in
the United States and European Community in just two areas
that are hallmarks of central government policy: agriculture and
taxation.
A. Agricultural Policy
1. The Community's Common Agricultural Policy
The Community's Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP") was
originally seen as one of the principal mechanisms by which
Member States could collaborate and benefit one another
through a Common (economic) Market.31 Long before the Eu-
ropean Economic Community was formed in 1957, agriculture
played a significant role in the economies of most European
states. Hence, each of them had elaborate national measures to
manage and support agriculture, and probably to protect it from
foreign competition. 2 Therefore, Member States (particularly
France) did not want to abandon their national support of agri-
culture without an equally elaborate Community system of agri-
cultural regulation.3 3 A common market for agricultural prod-
mies, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 3, 1993, Business Section, at 1 (discussing overhaul of Europe's
currenty exchange system).
30. William Drozdiak, France Balks at Trade Compromise; Nation Spurns Farm Deal
Reached Earlier in Day, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1993, at DI (concerning France's block of
compromise over agriculture in GATT negotiations).
31. See EEC Treaty, supra note 22, arts. 38-47, 298 U.N.T.S. at 30-36 (setting forth
Community's Common Agricultural Policy). Of special note are: "The common market
shall extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural products." Id. at art. 38(1), 298
U.N.T.S. at 30, and; "The operation and development of the common market for agri-
cultural products must be accompanied by the establishment of a common agricultural
policy among the Member States." Id. at art. 38(4), 298 U.N.T.S. at 30.
32. See 1 HANs SMrr, AND PETER HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY at 2-183 (1992). For example, price support schemes often were used to
insure that farmers had a reasonably adequate income, to protect the stability of food
supplies and to help guard against the negative effects of rapid and substantial changes
in price levels. Id.
33. FRANcis G. SNYDER, LAW OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 61 (1985).
Even in areas in which Member States have delegated authority to the Community, they
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ucts could not be created simply by eliminating customs duties
and quantitative restrictions (as was the case for industrial
goods). As a result, one common policy, set at the Community
level, was viewed as the best way to shield the agricultural sector
from extreme price variation, protect farmers' incomes, and yet
achieve a broad, interdependent market in agricultural goods.
Hence, the adoption of volumes of new "federalistic" regulations
(rather than the elimination of national regulations) was the av-
enue chosen by the Community to achieve a common market in
agricultural products. 34 So important was this objective that the
Treaty of Rome expressly provided that, should there be any dis-
crepancy between the CAP and general common market rules,
the CAP would prevail.3 5
Once the EEC Treaty was ratified by all Member States, the
Community convened an agricultural policy conference. Its pur-
pose was to compare the six states' agricultural policies and draft
a Community policy that would achieve a balance between sup-
ply and demand and a fair income for workers in the agriculture
36 th Unsector, just as the United States had once done. What ensued
was a highly-complex set of Community directives and regula-
tions, which aimed at properly defining "markets," setting the
appropriate market-price at which to intervene with price sup-
ports, erecting protections against cheap imports, and insuring
still retain substantial authority. id. For example, even though Member States cannot
take unilateral measures that interfere with the Community's price structure at the pro-
duction and wholesale stages, for products covered by a common market organization,
Member States retain the power to intervene at the retail and consumer price stages, so
long as the goals and functioning and price system are not affected. Id.
34. See, e.g., Council Regulation No. 804/68, OJ. L 148/13 (1968) (organizing
common market in milk and milk products); Council Regulation No. 1035/72, OJ. L
118/1 (1972) (organizing common market for fruits and vegetables).
35. See EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 42, 298 U.N.T.S. at 32. Article 42 provides,
in relevant part:
The provisions of the Chapter relating to rules on competition shall apply to
production of and trade in agricultural products only to the extent deter-
mined by the Council within the framework of Article 43(2) and (3) and in
accordance with the procedure laid down therein, account being taken of the
objectives set out in Article 39.
Id.
36. See EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 39, 298 U.N.T.S. at 30-31. Article 39 essen-
tially calls for the maximization of production; a fair standard of living for agricultural
workers; stable markets; and the availability of agricultural supplies throughout the
Community. Id.
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uniform purity.s7 As a result, EC agricultural regulations seem
to be as numerous and detailed as those of the United States,
and sometimes more so.3 8 These are not regulations imple-
mented by a central bureaucracy like the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, however, but through the respective agricultural re-
gimes of the various Member States. Thus, in its goals the Com-
munity can be every bit as "federal" as the United States; but in
their implementation and enforcement perhaps less so.
Quite recently, the Community modified the CAP to pay
farmers to keep land out of production, rather than buying their
"surplus" products at intervention, levels, which would constitute
a "subsidy." The change was made chiefly because the subsidiza-
tion program had not worked, but also partly in response to
American political pressure, for the United States alleged that
the CAP subsidy violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") .3 The apparent willingness of the Community
to concede this point precipitated violent, national protests by
French farmers,4" an event not likely to occur in America's agri-
cultural circles.
2. The U.S. Department of Agriculture
Although America's federal program governing agriculture
is far older41 than the Community's, the goals of the Department
of Agriculture, when it was created, were similar to those of the
Community: stable and livable farm prices; increased productiv-
ity; and consumer protection.4 2 Since the U.S. Supreme Court's
37. SNYDER, supra note 33, at 91.
38. See, e.g., Council Directive No. 160/72, O.J. 22/9 (1972) (encouraging farmers
between ages of 55 and 65, who had farmed all their lives, to retire from farming in
exchange for lump sum payments and annuities); Council Directive 161/72, Oj. 22/10
(1972) (providing for vocational retraining of farmers so that they could enter another
occupation); P.S.F.R. MATHJISEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 153 (5th ed.
1985).
39. Francis Snyder, Current Developments/European Community Law, 42 INT'L &
COMp. L.Q. 720, 720-21 (1993).
40. See David Gardner, Holding the Line on Farm Reform - Tough Challenges Facing the
NewEC Commissioner, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1993, at 28; see also, Farmers'International Gath-
ers in Strasbourgfor GA7T Protest, AGENCE FRANCE PRkSSE, Dec. 1, 1992, at 1.
41. See 7 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988); 7 C.F.R. § 2 (1993). The U.S. agricultural program
dates at least from 1892, when the U.S. Department of Agriculture was established. Id.
42. See generally 7 C.F.R. §§ 26-201 (1993) (marketing standards, inspections and
practices); 7 C.F.R. §§ 300-399 (1993) (animal and plant health); 9 C.F.R. §§ 1-199
(1993) (animal and plant health); 7 C.F.R. §§ 400-499 (1993) (crop insurance); 7 C.F.R.
§§ 500-599 (1993) (agricultural research); 7 C.F.R. §§ 600-699 (1993) (soil conserva-
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decision in Wickard v. Filburn,43 in 1942, it was clear that the U.S.
federal government would play a sizable role in setting farm pol-
icy.
Despite its significant influence in this sector, however, agri-
cultural regulation plays a relatively small role in federal regula-
tion generally, accounting for only about 4.1% of the federal
budget (about U.S.$54 billion annually), 4 whereas the agricul-
ture sector is responsible for about 3.3% of U.S. gross domestic
product ("GDP").4 In other words, the U.S. government invests
about 25% more in the agricultural sector than its percentage of
national GDP seems to warrant. That is a fairly high degree of
regulation, although agriculture is not America's most regulated
sector.
The CAP, however, is the Community's principal common
policy. In 1993, 48.8% of the Community's budget was spent on
some aspect of the CAP,4 6 yet only 2.6% of the Member States'
GDP is attributable to agriculture.47 The Community investment
is small in monetary terms only because the Community budget
is small.48 But, if the test of "federalism" is preoccupation with
tion); 7 C.F.R. §§900-1299 (1993)(marketing agreements and orders); 7 C.F.R.
§§ 1800-2099 (1993) (quality standards for commodities, commodity exchanges credit
and farm financing); 7 C.F.R. §§ 2800-2899 (1993) (food and safety quality); 9 C.F.R.
§§ 200-299 (1993) (livestock and regulation of stockyards). Congress has also directed
the Department of Agriculture to regulate standards for boxes and containers, flood
control, irrigation, minimum and maximum prices and marketing production quotas.
I JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & JAMES B. WADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAw 16 (1982).
43. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congressional regulation of intrastate activi-
ties in area of agricultural production can be regulated by Congress because of their
affect on interstate commerce).
44. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Table No. 498 - Federal
Budget Outlays, by Agency: 1980 to 1992, at 322 (1992), in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1992, THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK [hereinafter NATIONAL DATA
BOOK].
45. Telephone Interview with Dennis Kaplan, Budget Control & Analysis Division
Chief, U.S. Department of Agriculture, (Sept. 27, 1993).
46. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR AU-
DIOVISUAL, INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE, THE BUDGET OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNrIY 3 (1993).
47. Address by Mr. Rene Steichen at the 12th Annual European Agricultural Con-
ference of AGRA Europe in THE REUTER EUR. COMM'Y REP., Feb. 24, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
48. Court of Auditors Report, supra note 24, O.J. C 324/1. The Community's 1990
budget was just over U.S.$61 billion. Id. at 48. Between 50-70% of the Community's
budget is expended on some aspect of CAP. Id. "EC officials say they have reformed
the farm program, with subsidies decreasing from more than 70 percent of the Commu-
nity's total budget in the early 1980s to 56 percent this year." Charles Goldsmith, Dispute
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the regulation of a particular market sector, then the EC would
appear to win the "federalism" race hands down in the field of
agriculture.
B. Taxation
Another quintessential hallmark of "federalism" is the
power of a central government to tax and to distribute the pro-
ceeds thereof as it sees fit. If the Community equals or exceeds
U.S. federalization in the agricultural sector, it does not begin to
approach it in the tax field. The governments of the individual
Member States of the Community behave similarly to the united
states of the Union, but the Community does not.
1. The United States
The United States Constitution of 1791 gave Congress the
"Power To lay and collect ... Duties, Imposts and Excises ...
[provided they were] uniform throughout the United States."49
This is not unlike the Community's possessive external tariff au-
thority to raise its "own resources." The U.S. central government
was also given a general power of taxation, but "direct Taxes
[had to] be apportioned among the several States... according
to their respective Numbers (population) .. .
Taxes on goods or privileges, such as customs duties and
excises on specific items, like whiskey and salt, were considered
indirect taxes, and therefore did not require apportionment.
Hence, most federal government resources derived from cus-
toms duties prior to the twentieth century.5
The apportionment requirement made it difficult for Con-
gress to tap America's expanding wealth for budgetary purposes.
Merchants sought to keep tariffs low in order to stimulate trade,
Over European Farm Subsidies not New, UPI, July 10, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, UPI File.
49. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Constitution specified, however, that "No Tax
or Duty [should] be laid on Articles [of goods] Exported from any State." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 5. This is not unlike the Community's external tariff authority to raise its
"own resources." EEC Treaty, supra note 22, arts. 18-29, 298 U.N.T.S. at 22-26.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. A similar clause appears at art. I, § 9, cl. 4, ex-
tending to "Capitation, or other direct, Tax[es] . . . ." U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
51. MICHAELJ. GRAETz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, PRINCIPLES AND POuCIES 7 (2d
ed., 1988). In 1800, customs revenues accounted for U.S.$9.1 million (84.3%) of total
federal revenue of U.S.$10.8 million. Id. In 1870, U.S.$194.5 million out of a total
federal revenue of U.S.$411.3 million (47.2%) came from customs. Id.
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but could not be directly taxed on their property or profits, with-
out apportionment. This contrasted with the expanding role of
the central government during the years in question, and was
occasionally exacerbated by depression and war. Eventually, the
problem was solved by the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment
in 1913, unambiguously allowing Congress to tax income di-
rectly, without apportionment.5 2 Before that time, however,
there were several occasions in the nation's history when a de
facto, unapportioned, direct tax was levied by Congress.
Initially, this Congressional legislation was upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court, which rationalized the results vis t vis the
Constitution, when the revenue statute was attacked.53 The last
attack on such a measure was upheld,54 however, probably
prompting the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment.55 Shortly
beforehand, a Supreme Court case did hold, however, that cor-
porations were not protected by the apportionment require-
ment.
56
The nation's fiscal "need" during the War of 1812 and the
52. U.S. CoNsT., amend. XVI.
53. Hylton v. U.S., 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). In 1791, an unapportioned tax
levied by Congress on distilled spirits and carriages was upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court on the ground that it was not a "direct tax." Id. Internal taxes, save on salt, were
repealed in 1802, briefly reinstated during the War of 1812, but not imposed again until
the Civil War. The latter gave rise to a Congressional tax on real property, inheritance,
and income in excess of U.S.$600. See Springer v. U.S., 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1880) (up-
holding constitutionality of internal taxes). "Our conclusions are, that direct taxes,
within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that
instrument, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error
complains is within the category of an excise or duty." Id. Such taxes were repealed in
1872, but reinstated in 1894.
54. See Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), reh'g granted, 158
U.S. 601, 634 (1895) (overturning reinstated taxes). "The power to tax real and per-
sonal property, and the income from both ... is a direct tax in the meaning of the
constitution . . . ." Id. Notwithstanding, a Tariff Act in 1909, taxing corporate net
incomes in excess of U.S.$5000, was upheld in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107
(1911), on the ground that it was an excise tax on the privilege of doing business,
rather than a direct tax on property. See generally GmAEz, supra note 51, at 2-3.
It is clear that the Congress and the Supreme Court might have stretched the scope
of an ambiguous portion of Article I to meet current needs. Springer, 102 U.S. at 597-
98. Isn't it possible that a similar concern might motivate the European Court of Jus-
tice, when called upon to adjudge the scope of authority needed by Community institu-
tions in order to create a unified Europe?
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." Id.
56. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
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Civil War might have improved the prospect of this tax legisla-
tion being upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, these
judgments also establish that the important (and not forbidden)
objectives of a central government can find support from an
apolitical institution, like the judiciary, in a time of crisis, even
when clear authority therefor might be questionable .5  After all,
isn't that the essence of "constitutional" documents, such as
those that are the foundation of the United States and European
Community?
One might say that these approaches to tax authorization all
came in the "nick of time," for it is clear that the evolution of
twentieth century America required a broader revenue base than
customs alone could provide. By,1920, direct taxes having been
legalized by the Sixteenth Amendment, custom duties ac-
counted for only U.S.$323 million (5%) and income taxes for
U.S.$3.95 billion (58.9%) of a federal budget that had grown
from U.S.$567.2 million in 1900 to U.S.$6.7 billion in 1920.58 By
1965, income taxes produced U.S.$79.8 billion (85.7%) and cus-
toms only U.S.$1.5 billion (1.6%) of a federal budget of
U.S.$93.1 billion. 59 Today, federal taxation of personal income
yields over 40% of the nation's U.S.$1.2 trillion annual budget,'
and some of the largest budgetary expenditures are for national
defense (20.8%), and health and human resources (36.6%), and
not structural policies, which involve a mere pittance of the to-
tal. 6 1
2. The European Community
The European Community, by contrast, has not been given
the power to raise revenue through direct taxation of Member
States' citizens.62 Hence, the Community is limited to raising
57. Springer, 102 U.S. at 597-98.
58. GRAETZ, supra note 51, at 7.
59. Id.
60. NATIONAL DATA BooK, supra note 44, Table No. 492 - Federal Receipts, by
source: 1980 to 1992, at 316; Id., Table No. 491- Federal Budget - Summary 1945
to 1992, at 315.
61. Id., Table No. 495 - Federal Outlays, by Detailed Function: 1980 to 1992, at
318, 319.
62. See EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 99, 298 U.N.T.S. at 53-54. When the Com-
munity was conceived, the Member States recognized that harmonious taxation
throughout the Community was necessary to establish a common market. Yet they were
also conscious of the fact that the power to tax was closely linked with a Member State's
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revenue largely from indirect taxes, and then only to the extent
and from the sources that the Member States approve, acting as
the European Council.6 3 The Community does have a common
customs tariff"4 (at least on goods that do not "originate" within
the Community), similar to the tariff provisions in the U.S. Con-
stitution. 65 This tariff has replaced and precludes individual
Member States' tariffs6" and raises "own resources" for the Com-
munity. These tariffs, however, are small in amount67 and are set
by legislation, not "constitutional in nature." It is no surprise
then, that the Community budget pales by comparison to the
larger Member States in virtually every sector.' Furthermore,
the budget does not enjoy an independent, constitutional basis,
sovereignty. The Member States were not willing to delegate the power of direct taxa-
tion to a central Community authority. However, to further the common market, Arti-
cle 99 of the Treaty of Rome directed the Commission to consider how to harmonize
the various Member States' legislation concerning indirect taxation. Id. art. 99, 298
U.N.T.S. at 53-54. Pursuant to this charge, two directives were enacted instructing the
individual Member States to adopt a value added tax (VAT) by January 1, 1970. See
Council Directive No. 67/227, 10J.O. 1301 (1967); Council Directive No. 67/228, 10
J.O. 1303 (1967). InJanuary 1968, France enacted aVAT system according to the direc-
tives, this VAT replacing a less sophisticated French VAT. Denmark enacted a VAT in
July 1967; West Germany inJanuary 1968; Netherlands inJanuary 1969; Luxembourg in
January 1970; Belgium in January 1971; Ireland in November 1972; Italy in January
1973; the U.K in April 1973; Spain and Portugal in January 1986; and Greece injanuary
1987. ALAN A. TMT, VALUE ADDED TAX 10, 11, tbl. 1-2 (1988).
Article 99 of the Single European Act imposed a further obligation on the Council
to harmonize indirect taxes within the EC to the extent harmonization was necessary to
ensure the "establishment and function of the common market." Single European Act,
art. 99, OJ. L 169/1, at 8 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741, at 749 (amending Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958)) [hereinafter SEA].
63. See, e.g., From the Single Act to Maastricht and Beyond: The Means to Match
Our Ambitions, 25 E.C. BULL., Supp. 1/92, at 33 [hereinafter Single Act] (discussing
recent changes in source and amount of EC funding, adopted at Edinburgh Summit,
December, 1992).
64. Council Regulation No. 950/68,J.O. L 172/1 (1968), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968,
at 925.
65. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, and § 9, cl. 2.
66. Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur, Case 38/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1439, [1976]
1 C.M.L.R. 167; Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen v. Waren-Import, Case 74/69, [1970]
E.C.R. 451, 463, [1970] C.M.L.R. 466, 491.
67. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR BUDG-
ETS, THE COMMUNITY BUDGET: THE FAcrS IN FIGURES 31, tbl. 4 (1993). EC tariffs
amounted to ECU$9,410 million in 1992, or 18.9% of the Community budget (conver-
sion used: U.S.$1.3 = I ECU). Id.
68. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing small size of Community
budget).
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but rather depends, to a large extent, on the legislative action in
Council.
The most significant source of revenue for both the Mem-
ber States and the Community is the value added tax ("VAT") .69
In 1991, over 60% of the Community's revenue came from Mem-
ber States' VAT contributions.7" The VAT is collected by each
individual Member State as part of its internal tax system, and a
percentage (currently 1.4%) of the amount collected is contrib-
uted to the Community budget. Thereafter, this money be-
comes the Community's "own resources,"71 although its distribu-
tion is heavily influenced by representatives of the Member
States.7" Thus, neither the decision to collect taxes; the manner
of so doing; nor the pattern of redistribution is left entirely to
the Community. The Member States influence each of these de-
cisions.
Any change in the "tax" formula must be unanimously ap-
proved by the Member States,7 and is by no means guaran-
teed. 4 Unlike a sovereign nation then, the Community is pow-
69. See THE VALUE-ADDED TAX: LESSONS FROM EUROPE 2 (HenryJ. Aaron ed., 1981).
VAT is the difference between the value of a firm's sales and the value of the material
used to produce the goods sold. Id. VAT is chargeable within a Member State to "taxa-
ble persons," i.e., those persons or bodies who carry out the production, trading or
supplying of services such as agriculture, mining and professional activities. See D. Lasok
andJ.W. Bridge, THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY 533 (5th ed.
1991).
70. Court of Auditors Report, supra note 24, O.J. C 324/1, at 51.
71. THE BUDGET OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 46, at 6.
72. Id. at 8.
73. Seejonathan S. Schwarz, Survey of the European Single Market, FIN. TiMES,Jan. 19,
1993, at 9. Recently, the Member States agreed that, as ofJanuary 1, 1993, a minimum
VAT rate of 15% would be set for all States. Id. This regime is intended to produce
over time a system whereunder transactions between Member States were taxed at the
same rate as those within each State. Id.
74. See Single Act, supra note 63, at 33
The 1988 European Council wanted the resources paid by each Member State
to coincide more closely with its ability to pay. To achieve this, it decided to
expand and alter the composition of own resources. The VAT base was
capped at 55% of GNP with the maximum call-in rate maintained at 1.4%: an
additional own resource based on the aggregate GNP of the Member States
was introduced to ensure that revenue and expenditure balanced in the
budget.
The new system placed the Community's finances on a sound footing. How-
ever, experience shows that, so far, only moderate progress has been made in
bringing the structure of resources into line with Member States' ability to pay.
As could be expected, VAT has continued to be the main source of the Com-
munity's finances and in 1992 still accounts for over 50% of own resources.
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erless to pass new taxes, even to cover the cost of its own opera-
tions, and may be forced to try to accomplish more in the way of
Community programs, with less in Community resources. The
Community itself - except for an appeal to the Council - can-
not change its circumstances. 75
Although the Community's structural programs have a re-
distributive effect, 76 it is one that the Member States must ap-
prove when passing the Community budget. Hence, they have
the ability to influence the amount they receive from - as well
as contribute to - Community funds.
7 7
Proposed changes in the Community's "tax" system were
considered and partially adopted at the December, 1992, Edin-
burgh summit. They would shift emphasis from the VAT, as a
However, the regressive nature of the VAT resource is the main cause of the
distortions which affect the financing system, this is because the least prosper-
ous Member States as a rule devote a large proportion of their GNP to con-
sumption. Capping the VAT base at a certain percentage of GNP may help to
limit this drawback, but the level at which it is capped at present is not low
enough to bring the VAT bases of these countries sufficiently into line with the
GNP bases.
For some Member States, on the other hand, the present system is particularly
advantageous, since the VAT base accounts for a distinctly small proportion of
GNP.
The rapid growth of the GNP-based resource may well attenuate this situation.
But this resource still accounts for only 20% of Community resources.
Id.
75. See The Commission's Programme for 1992, 25 E.C. BULL., Supp. 1/92, at 44-
45 (1992) [hereinafter Commission's 1992 Programme]. In its annual programme state-
ment to the European Parliament in 1992, the Commission envisioned a wider role for
the Community in Eastern Europe, specifically mentioning Poland, Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, in which the Commission estimates they
have already invested ECU 2.6 billion, but without purporting where the aid is to come
from. Id. The program also mentions "new responsibilities abroad"; the "Cohesion
Fund approved at Maastricht"; and "increasing the resources available for the operation
of the Structural Funds", but then acknowledges that "its proposal for the new financial
perspective for 1993-1997 [its funding proposal to the Edinburgh Summit, being only
partially successful] ... will have to incorporate Member States' determination to con-
tain public expenditure and the need to make more allowance for Member States' abil-
ity to pay." Id. at 43-44.
At another point, the report reads: "A special effort will be required of all Commis-
sion staff in 1992 .... [Clonsolidation of its human potential (precarious balance be-
tween in-house and external staff) must be pursued, and programming and priority-
setting still need to be improved." Id. at 45.
76. Fixing the EC Budget, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at 20.
77. Id. The Common Agricultural Policy, which accounts for the lion's share of
Community redistribution, often ends up benefitting wealthier Member States such as
Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg, which has been called "Robin Hood in reverse".
Id.
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source of Community funding (lowering Member States' contri-
butions from 1.4% to 1.0%), to a percentage of Community's
GNP" (a requested rise in the Community's "own resources"
ceiling from 1.2% to 1.37% by 1997). 71 This would make the
European "tax" system more fair, but it would continue to be
operated in a most "un-federal" way.
C. Economic Cohesion in the EC and U.S.
Hence, the Community's income and expenditure is easily
traceable to individual Member States, quite unlike the United
States.8" In the United States, citizens and businesses contribute
directly to the central government's tax coffers. State payments
are modest, at best. By and large, this tax revenue is commin-
gled in such a way that none of it is "earmarked" for any particu-
lar state, region or purpose. By that yardstick of federalism, the
Community might strain to lay claim to "con-federalism."
On the other hand, the goal of a single European Currency
(ECU) and greater cohesion in monetary policy, which have not
been abandoned despite recent setbacks,81 do at least lay a foun-
dation for what may become a more-centralized Community tax
policy.8 2 Moreover, Mr. Jacques Delors, the Commission Presi-
78. See Single Act, supra note 63, at 33.
79. Id. at 32. The U.S. budget in 1990 was approximately U.S.$1.2 trillion. NA-
TIONAL DATA Boor, supra note 44, Table No. 495 - Federal Outlays, by Detailed Func-
tion: 1980 to 1992, at 318-319. The Community budget was just over U.S.$61 billion.
Court of Auditors Report, supra note 24, O.J. C 324/1 at 48.
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 108-09 (Alexander Hamilton) (Goldwin Smith ed.,
rev. ed., 1901)
Let Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina, Pennsylvania with Connecti-
cut, or Maryland with New Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the respec-
tive abilities of those States, in relation to revenue, bear little or no analogy to
their comparative stock in lands or to their comparative population ....
[C]learly... there can be no common measure of national wealth, and of
course no general or stationary rule, by which the ability of a State to pay taxes
can be determined. The attempt . . . to regulate the contributions of the
members of a confederacy by any such rule cannot fail to [produce] glaring
inequality .... The suffering States would not long consent to remain associ-
ated .... There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience but by
authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues ....
Id.
81. See Laurent Belsie, Europe Slogs Ahead in Melding Economies, CHRISTIAN SC. MON-
rrOR, Dec. 1, 1993, at 10 (discussing recent difficulties encountered by EEC's attempt to
move to single European currency).
82. See DE Toc-umiLuE, supra note 4, at 388-89.
The slightest observation in the United States enables one to appreciate the
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dent,83 has been able to get the Member States to commit to a
more stable and long-term Community funding policy, in place
of the annual budget imbroglio that once obtained.84 However,
the present economic downturn has placed extreme pressure on
the Community's progress toward a unified future.85
Clearly, a "central" government cannot function if it does
not have sufficient resources for its operations. In its 1992 pres-
entation to the European Parliament, the Commission ex-
pressed a need for greater "own resources" to finance the Com-
advantage which the country derives from the bank. [Its] bank-notes... are
taken upon the borders of the desert for the same value as at Philadelphia,
where the Bank conducts its operations .... The Bank may be regarded as the
great monetary tie of the Union, just as Congress is the great Legislative tie
Id.
Compare id. with Address by Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, to the
European Parliment on the Occasion of the Investiture Debate of the New Commis-
sion, in E.C BuLL., Supp. 1/93 at 8 [hereinafter Delors Address]. Commission President
Jacques Delors', in a speech to the European Parliament in February of 1993 said:
[C]ompetitive devaluation is not the answer to the problems facing [the Com-
munity] today .... [T]he timetable for economic and monetary union may not
be met, with the result that we will lose the hard-won gains of 1985 to 1990
.... [W]e must consolidate, not merely defend, the European Monetary Sys-
tem .... [P] ussyfooting [has] cost us dearly .... We must persevere, we must
confirm our political determination in the face of speculation, we must
strengthen economic and monetary cooperation to make our stance credible.
Id.
83. EEC Treaty, supra note 22, arts. 155-163, 298 U.N.T.S. at 71-73.
84. Single Act, supra note 63, at 22.
The Interinstitutional Agreement [by which budgetary procedures were
changed and outcomes made more certain] has undoubtedly contributed to a
smoother budgetary procedure and helped see that budgets were adopted on
time. There were no more of the minor conflicts which so often in the past
had opposed [the] Council and [the] Parliament, the two arms of the budget-
ary authority.
Id.
85. Delors Address, supra note 82, at 7. In his address to the European Parliment
on February 10, 1993, President Delors said:
Economic convergence, a stronger European Monetary System, job creation
- these priorities ... formed a whole. But they were put in jeopardy by a
number of factors. Chief among these was the renationalization of economic
policies... [including] the European Council's refusal to give the Community
the means ... to encourage European companies to cooperate to become
more competitive in a world dominated by economic war.
Id. at 7. President Delors also warned that because of these difficult times, and the lack
of agreement about what the Community should do and how quickly, "[t]he very idea of
a united Europe could be in peril." Id.
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munity program it envisioned. 6 Specifically, the Commission
sought an increase in its own resources ceiling from 1.2% to
1.37% of Community GNP through 1997.87 This was, it said, a
"cautious estimate of the financial implications of the decisions
taken at Maastricht.""" To cushion the impact this would have
on Member State resources, the Commission suggested that, "in
some sectors Community expenditure will replace some national
expenditure."8 9 This is not the news the Eurocautious wanted to
hear. What the Commission got in Edinburgh, therefore, was an
increase to only 1.27%, not to begin until 1994.90 In other
words, almost no "real" growth in Commission financing will oc-
cur through 1997, unless the European economy picks up signif-
icantly.91
The extra money sought was needed, the Commission said,
to fund the "cohesion program" (ECU11 billion - essentially to
strengthen the economies of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain); to increase "external action" (foreign aid); and to im-
prove European "competitiveness" (ECU3.5 billion).92 The lat-
ter is essentially an economic stimulus program, run by the Com-
munity rather than the Member States. But, as late as mid-1993,
President Delors was complaining that the ECU20 billion
(U.S.$24 billion) economic growth initiative announced at the
Edinburgh summit, was not being addressed by the European
Council.9" He suggested that, for lack of an adequate program
to deal with high unemployment and "non-competitiveness," Eu-
rope was falling even farther behind the United States and Ja-
pan.9 4
86. Single Act, supra note 63, at 32.
87. Id. The increase would be approximately ECU20 billion, based on projected
economic growth of 2.5% a year. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. THE BUDGET OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY, supra note 46, at 6; see Conclusions
of the Presidency, Conference of the European Council, Edinburgh, Scotland, Dec. 11-
12, 1992, pt. C, Annex 1, Financial Perspectives Table [hereinafter Conclusions of the
Presidency] [on file with The Fordham International Law Journal].
91. Single Act, supra note 77, at 32.
92. Delors Address, supra note 82, at 10.
93. EC Faces its Worst Growth Prospects Since the War, Says Delors, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, May 26, 1993.
94. Id.; see Andrew Marshall, Delors Says EC is Falling Behind, THE INDEPENDENT, May
27, 1993, at 13. According to Mr. Delors, the U.S. and Japanese economies "had cre-
ated 20 million and 11 million new jobs, respectively, between 1970 and 1990, [while]
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Clearly, the Member States of the Community regard the
world economic downturn - both politically and economically
- as a "crisis" that each should confront individually; even at the
risk of some chaos, inefficiency and possibly wasteful competi-
tion. Their actions suggest that they do not see the Community
as playing a major role in this process.95 And, frankly, it would
be difficult (if not impossible) to accomplish the broad (and ex-
panding) goals of the Community if the Commission must al-
ways ask permission to take the necessary action or cannot com-
mand the resources to do so. 96 In the United States, the situa-
tion is reversed. All or most states have undertaken an economic
stimulus or recovery program of some sort, but the principal fo-
cus of state leaders, and especially citizens, is on the federal re-
covery plan, proposed by President Clinton.
Faced with this paradox of expectation versus resources and
authority, the Commission's only option is to restructure; to
compress work within its static or shrinking workforce and to
practice the tightest budget discipline.97 Neither of these traits
is particularly a hallmark of central governments. As one might
expect, therefore, the Commission made a "federalistic" budget-
the EC had created only 8.8 million." Id. He said that "the EC's share of world trade
had slipped from 21 per cent in 1981 to 16 per cent [today]." Id.
95. Delors Address, supra note 82, at 10. The Community's research and educa-
tion programs, aimed at improving its economic competitiveness in world markets,
.represent a mere 4% of the training and employment budgets of the Member States
Id.
96. The Commission's work programme for 1993-94, in E.C. BuLL., Supp. 1/93 at
18 [hereinafter Commission's 1993-94 programme].
The Community must use all the means at its disposal to counter the signifi-
cant slowdown in economic activity. Its credibility and its very future are at
stake .... The growth initiative approved by the European Council should
promote economic recovery in Europe. For the first time ever, concerted ac-
tion by the Member States is to be matched by Community action to stimulate
growth. The Commission has made its contribution .... A raft of measures
will have to be adopted without delay .... [The Commission] will use all its
powers and every opportunity for international dialogue to lead its partners
along a road to economic recovery, in the light inter alia of the approach
adopted by the new US [Clinton] Administration.
Id. The European Council, however, has been slow to fund these initiatives, and they
are modest in any event.
97. Single Act, supra note 63, at 35. "[T]he 1992 budget.., makes the normal
administrative operation of the institutions and in particular the Commission impossi-
ble. [It] ... must no longer be forced to make do with the leftovers." Id.; see Commis-
sion's 1993-94 programme, supra note 96, at 16.
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ary proposal in its 1992 program presentation.9" It proposed:
"improvements" in the 1988 Interinstitutional Agreement; a "fi-
nancial framework" running from 1993-1997; and the hope that
"any revision of the ceilings set ...should be agreed by the
Council acting simply by a qualified majority." The proposal
concluded that "[e]xperience over the last three years indicates
[that] . . . the Commission must be able to mobilize resources
and react quickly .... ,9 In other words, act more like a central
government institution. 00 But, in the area of "taxation" and tax-
resource allocation, the Community has a long way to go.
Of course, these last few estimates regarding "federalism"
may depend too heavily on stop-action pictures of the Commu-
nity's present stance, mired as it is in a stubborn recession. This
jaundiced assessment may not give the Community sufficient
credit for its evolution to this point.101 Mr. Delors, the Commis-
sion's President since 1985, is fond of reminding Euro-sceptics
that, if you were asked at any point in time whether the Commu-
nity could meet a particular goal, you would think it could not;
and then be surprised, five years later, when it had met or sur-
passed it.'0 2
98. See Grossfeld, supra note 26, at 126 (asserting that "[i]t was the Commission that
pushed the European idea ahead with relentless vigor").
99. Single Act, supra note 63, at 35-36.
100. Delors Address, supra note 82, at 7-8.
[W] e need a medium-term perspective too. This implies turning a deaf ear to
the siren voices that tempt us to go it alone, to look after number one, all too
often the attitude of governments in times of crisis. If we [in the Community]
fail to reverse this trend, our countries will suffer individually, because com-
petitive devaluation is not the answer to the problems facing us today.
Id.
101. See Siegfried Wiessner, Federalism: An Architecture for Freedom, 1 NEw EUR. L.
Rv. 129 (Spring 1993). In an extremely thoughtful piece that was part of a symposium
on "Federalism for the New Europe", Professor Wiessner writes: "The concept of feder-
alism itself eludes easy delimitation .... [WIithout further reflection, [it] is simply
equated with the particular shape it has found in the constitutional system of the
United States." Id. at 132. But what is really "critical [is] that federalism as a particular
form of territorial political organization actually foster the variety of values it is said to
promote .... [T] he words federal, confederal, region, alliance, and coalition are pri-
marily meaningful in their suggestion of the infinite variety of potential modalities in
organization .... [F]ederalism [simply] denotes [a] vertical allocation [of power] among
a variety of territorially-based communities." Id. at 138-40.
102. See Delors Address, supra note 82, at 6-7.
[W] ith the world-wide economic crisis, Europeans have forgotten the truly im-
pressive advances that flowed from revitalization of the European venture
thanks to Parliament's draft Constitution, the 1992 target, the boost provided
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III. THE GROWTH OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY
A. "Constitutional" Powers
Although it is not fair to compare institutional "growth" in
the 1990's with that of the 1790's, in chronological years the
Community, when compared to the fledgling United States, has
just arrived in 1827. At about that time in U.S. history, the
Supreme Court was just deciding what authority states had to tax
federal entities doing business within their borders.103 Twenty-
by the Single Act and the 1988 consensus on policy and financial priorities
.... Despite progress since 1985, the Community... has been clogged by...
collective amnesia about past achievements.
Id.; see also Isobel Hilton, Remarks at the University of Edinburgh, in BEYOND THE INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCES: EUROPEAN UNION IN THE 1990's, at 18 (Europa Institute,
William E. Patterson ed., 1991). "[M]y general law of Community development [is that]:
at any point in the EC's history you could argue, looking back, that if you wanted to get
here, ideally you wouldn't have started from there. And, looking forward, that trying to
get there is clearly impossible starting from here. Nevertheless, onward it goes." Id.
103. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, the
state of Maryland sought to tax (on the same terms applied to state banks), and to
penalize for the non-payment of taxes, a federal bank operating in Maryland. Part of
Maryland's argument was that the states had created the federal government and it was
the former that were "truly sovereign." Id. at 402. Hence, exercises of federal authority
must be subordinated to the states, "who alone possess supreme domination." Id. Jus-
tice Marshall, in what may be his greatest opinion among many, wrote for the court
majority that it was the people and not the states who approved the Constitution. Id. at
403. It was from them that the federal government "derives its whole authority. Id.
The government proceeds directly from the people." Id.
The European Community clearly derives its authority from the assent of the Mem-
ber State governments, although it is not clear what prerogatives they have to dissent
from Community action when it is taken within delegated or transferred competencies.
See EEC Treaty, supra note 22, pmbl., 298 U.N.T.S. at 14.
More important in the McCulloch case, however (at least at this point in the evolu-
tion of U.S. "federalism"), wasJustice Marshall's opinion to the effect that, although the
government was one of "enumerated powers," and although "we do not find that of
establishing a bank or creating a corporation [among them] ... there is no phrase...
[excluding the exercise of] incidental or implied powers." Id. at 406.
Congress is given the authority in the U.S. Constitution to exercise those legislative
prerogatives that are "necessary and proper" to achieve the goals assigned to it. U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18. But the arrogation to the central government of "incidental or
implied powers" was a significant increase of authority, to which the state delegates to
the "Constitutional Convention" (and perhaps the people themselves) would possibly
not have agreed in 1789.
In the European Economic Community, the European Court of Justice still nar-
rowly insists that all Community legislation clearly and accurately identify its source of
competence in the Treaties. See Meroni v. ECSC High Authority, Case 9/56, [1957-58]
E.C.R. 133; United Kingdom v. EC Council, Case 68/86, [1988] E.C.R. 855, [1988] 2
C.M.L.R. 543.
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eight years after the federal government was formed, this princi-
ple was still being disputed.
In 1824, the right of various governments to license the use
of navigable waterways within their borders was finally settled in
favor of the preeminent right of Congress (the federal govern-
ment).1° 4 In 1851, the Supreme Court returned some of this
power to the states, however, holding that the authority was
shared by the state and federal governments, so long as the
state's regulation did not unnecessarily interfere with interstate
commerce. 10 5 Hence, sixty years after the establishment of the
U.S. federal government, the sphere of authority exclusively oc-
cupied by the state or national governments, and that shared,
was still being questioned.
In 1857, a divided U.S. Supreme Court held (in the infa-
mous "Dred Scott decision"), that other states and the federal
government were powerless to interfere with the so-called "prop-
erty" rights to a Black slave granted a person under the law of his
native state.10 6 The Supreme Court majority was sensitive to the
legal/political prerogatives claimed - and exercised - by the
various state governments over the slavery issue, and it was not
eager to exacerbate these differences, which later erupted into
civil war.10 7 By a strict reading of the U.S. Constitution, a posi-
tion later abandoned, the federal government was held to have
no competence in this matter.10 Such disputes, on a considera-
bly more modest scale, continue in Constitutional litigation to
the present day.10 9
104. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
105. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). In Cooty, the
U.S. Supreme Court held it possible for the Constitution's interstate commerce clause
to leave room for states to specify that local pilots be used as an aid to navigation in
local waters. Id, Gibbons left the issue of concurrent authority in the state and federal
governments somewhat open. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1.
106. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). The Supreme Court,
in Dred Scott, held that the so-called "Missouri Compromise" of 1820 (concerning the
admission to the Federal Union of "free" and "slave" states in equal numbers) was be-
yond Congress' substantive due process powers. Id. Because of its concern about fed-
eral/state friction in this area, the Court was rather insistent that Congress identify its
source of authority in the Constitution. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 502 N.W.2d 649 (1993) (concerning whether Iowa or
Michigan courts should enjoy exclusive custody jurisdiction under the federal Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980).
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If the U.S. struggled under its Articles of Confederation and
early Constitution, the Community had its inception in the rela-
tively-modest European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)." °
It aimed at nothing more than controlling coal and steel produc-
tion among six nations, chiefly France and Germany. 1  The
more-ambitious, Common Market goal, set forth in the Treaty of
Rome, 1 2 is a little more like our federal Constitution, with its
allegedly limited, "enumerated powers"' 13 and economic and se-
curity objectives. Both "unions" shared a concern that tradition-
ally-competitive states somehow get along with one another."1
4
110. ECSC Treaty, supra note 15, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
111. Id. The ECSC was formed in 1952 among six nations: Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. It was quite limited in scope, indeed, it
was limited to 50-years duration, whereas the EEC Treaty is for an "unlimited duration".
Id., art. 97, 261 U.N.T.S. at 227; EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 240, 298 U.N.T.S. at 92.
112. See EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 15. "The Community
[established by Article 1] shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of [the] Member States, to promote
throughout the Community [economic expansion, stability, higher living standards] and
closer relations between the States belonging to it." Id.; cf. U.S. CONSr., pmbl.
113. See THE FEDERAusT No. 44, at 256 (James Madison) (Goldwin Smith ed., rev.
ed., 1901). 'The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal Govern-
ment, are few and defined." Id. Cf THE FEDERALIsT No. 23, at 122 (Alexander Hamil-
ton), "[I]t is both unwise and dangerous to deny the Federal Government an uncon-
fined authority, in respect to all those objects which are entrusted to its management."
Id.; see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 405 (1819). 'This government is
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers .... ." Id.
114. See EEC Treaty, supra note 22, pmbl., 298 U.N.T.S. at 14 ('[rlecognizing that
the removal of existing [trade barriers] calls for concerted action"); Id., art. 169, 298
U.N.T.S. at 75 (giving Commission the authority to bring complaint 'before the [Euro-
pean] Court ofJustice" if "the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to
fulfill an obligation under [the] Treaty (following a reasoned opinion to that effect));
Id. art. 170, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75 (giving same authority to other Member States (without
a reasoned opinion)).
See also Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, J.O. L 299/32 (1972), amended by O.J. L 304/77 (1978),
amended by OJ. L 388/1 (1982), amended by O.J. L 285/1 (1989). All current Member
States are signatories to the Convention, but it does not cover all judgements, and is
technically outside the Community treaties. Id. There is good reason to believe that
the Community will work hard to assure that all future members become signatories at
the time of their accession to the Community. In due course, this principle of mutual
recognition ofjurisdiction and judgements (with the usual jurisprudential exceptions)
is likely to be written into the treaties as a basic tenant of a single commercial markeL
This step was probably impossible in 1957, but accomplished in 1968 only because it was
optional for each state to sign the Brussels Convention.
In the U.S. Constitution, the same latitude was not given. The so-called "full faith
and credit" clause of Article IV, Section 1, affirmatively declares that "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings
of every other State." U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1. As interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
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But the Community achieved this by coopting the Member
States and requiring them, under the EEC Treaty, to enforce
valid Community law, even without a large central bureaucracy
or uniform approach to legislation.115
The Community's other significant steps toward a more
"federalized" union were the Single European Act of 1986 (prob-
ably the most successful treaty venture to date, albeit one aided
by a period of extraordinary economic expansion) and, just
three years later, the almost dangerously-ambitious Maastricht
agreement. 16 Reinforcing these developments were the direct
election of Members of the European Parliament in 1979 (akin
to the direct election of Senators in the U.S.), 11 7 "qualified ma-
jority" voting in the Council (versus unanimous voting, or the
Court, the Clause is applied much more strictly to judicial decisions than public acts
and records. See, e.g., Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). Moreover,
the duty of states to recognize "sister" states' actions continues to be tested in the U.S.
Supreme Court. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980). Similarly,
equivalent obligations are tested in the European Court of Justice. See, e.g, France v.
United Kingdom, Case 141/78, [1979 E.C.1. 2923, [1980] 1 C.M.L.I. 6.
There are also significant parallels between the "interstate commerce" authority of
Congress in the U.S. Constitution and the agreement among the Community's Member
States to foreswear and dismantle protective tariffs and quantitative restrictions. "The
Congress shall have Power To ... regulate Commerce ... among the several States
... .U.S. CONST., art. 1, 8, cl. 1-3. "The Community shall be based upon a customs
union.., which shall involve the prohibition between Member States of customs duties
on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect.r " EEC Treaty, supra
note 22, art. 9, 298 U.N.T.S. at 18-19; "Member States shall refrain from introducing
between themselves any new customs duties.., or ... charges having equivalent effect,
and from increasing those which they already apply.... ." Id., art. 12, 298 U.N.T.S. at
19-20; "Customs duties on imports in force between Member States shall be progres-
sively abolished . . . ." Id., art. 13, 298 U.N.T.S. at 20; "Quantitative restrictions on
imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall [with limited exceptions con-
tained in the Treaty] ... be prohibited between Member States." Id., art. 30, 298
U.N.T.S. at 26.
115. Lenaerts, supra note 5, at 15-16 n.23, 17-18, 29-30.
116. SEA, supra note 62, O.J. L 169/1, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741; Treaty on European
Union, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) (amending Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1
(Cmd. 5179-1I), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958)) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
117. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Although it now seems like a long-forgotten
aspect of the United States' democratic evolution, the original Constitution provided
that members of the least numerous and, arguably, most powerful House of Congress
(the Senate), meant to represent the states, or citizens thereof, would be "chosen by the
Legislature thereof...." Id. It was not until the Seventeenth Amendment was passed
in 1913 - over 120 years later - that the original Constitution was amended to pro-
vide that the "Senators from each State, [should be] elected by the people thereof....
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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stagnating Luxembourg accords)"' and a cooperation process
(with Maastricht, an alleged co-decisional process) between the
Parliament and Council." 9 But for the British objection, the
Luxembourg non-paper might already have inserted the term
"federal" into the Community lexicon. But then, what's in a
name? As I said before, "federalism" (at least in the United
States) was not an event but a process. 2 °
Before I continue to the last topic, which is whether and
how "creeping federalism" can be slowed or stopped, I want to
mention one other interesting - perhaps inevitable - parallel
between the United States and the European Community. That
is the role played by their high courts during their respective
formative periods.
B. The High Courts' Influence on "Federalism "121
One difference in the two Courts' powers is clear. The U.S.
Constitution addresses the three interdependent branches of
the federal government in apparent order of importance. The
Supreme Court is established by the Third Article. This has
led some commentators to suggest that the judiciary is the "least
dangerous" branch of the U.S. government.123 The European
118. See Henry G. Schermer, Comment on Weiler's The Transformation of Europe, 100
YALE L.J. 2525, 2534; see also LASOK AND BRIDGE, supra note 69, at 23740. Also compare
the so-called "Missouri Compromise" of 1820, in the U.S., which allowed the entrance
into the Federal Union of one "slave" state only if matched by one "free" state.
119. Id. at 257; see Maastricht Treaty, supra note 116, art. 189(b) & (c), (1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 694-97; Trevor Hartley, Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht
Agreement, 42 Irr'L AND COMP. L.Q. 213, 222-26 (1993).
120. See Delors Address, supra note 82, at 10, 12-13. Although Commission Presi-
dent Delors professes to be less than "happy with the foreign policy provisions of the
[Maastricht] Treaty ... " he says, in the same speech, that 62% of the aid pledged,
including loans, to Central and Eastern Europe under the Phare program, two-thirds of
foreign aid to the former Soviet Union, and 31% of world aid to the Mediterranean
region is attributable to the Member States of the Community, or to the Community
itself. Id.
121. DE TOCQUELLE, supra note 4, at 119-20. "A Federal Government stands in
greater need of the support ofjudicial institutions than any other, because it is naturally
weak, and exposed to formidable opposition." Id.
122. See U.S. CONST. art. III § 1. "Thejudicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." Id.
123. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton) (Goldwin Smith ed.,
rev. ed., 1901). Hamilton calls the judiciary the "least dangerous" branch of govern-
ment, at least when compared to the executive and legislative. Id.; see ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH, (2d ed. 1986); THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James
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Community, by contrast, appears to have placed its greatest con-
fidence in the European Court of Justice ("ECJ");124 although it
too is listed as the last of the Community's major institutions in
the Treaty of Rome.125
The reason I say this is that the ECJ is given the ultimate and
exclusive power (and obligation) to "ensure that in the interpre-
tation and application of [the EC] Treaty the law is observed."'2 6
This makes sense, for the ECJ is to be composed of persons of
learning and impartiality,127 hopefully above the politics that
might influence the decisions of the Council, Parliament, and
possibly even the Commission. 12
In at least one sense, the ECJ did not disappoint. 2 9 The
judges did their best to make certain that the individual Member
States' commitment to union was enforced (as against parochial
interests), and the States in return (if grudgingly) accepted the
Courts' judgments. 30 This is well, for the Court and Commis-
Madison); cf. DE TOCQuEvILLE, supra note 4, at 82: "The political power which the
Americans have entrusted to their courts ofjustice is... immense...." Id. "Scarcely
any question arises in the United States which does not become, sooner or later, a
subject of judicial debate . . . ." Id. at 261.
124. EEC Treaty, supra note 22, arts. 164-88, 298 U.N.T.S. at 73-78.
125. Id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 73-78.
126. Id. art. 164, 298 U.N.T.S. at 73. This is especially important as regards dis-
putes between or among the Community institutions and/or Member States. See id.
arts. 169, 170, 173, 175 and 177-182, .298 U.N.T.S. at 75-78 (outlining jurisdiction of
European Court of Justice). Note also that Member States' national courts "may" (if
not courts of last resort) and "shall" (if they are a court without recourse), seek a "pre-
liminary ruling" from the European Court if "a question is raised [before the Member
State court or tribunal that] ... it considers [must be answered in order] ... to enable it
to give judgement. . . ." Id. art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. at 76-77.
127. See id. art. 167, 298 U.N.T.S. at 74 (regarding qualifications to be a Judge or
Advocate-General of Court: "persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who
possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in
their respective countries . . . ."); see also Maastricht Treaty, supra note 116, art 168a,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R at 685-86 (concerning similar, but slightly lower, standards set for
judges of European Court of First Instance, which has no Advocate-Generals to assist it).
128. Commission's 1992 Programme, supra note 75, at 45, "Lobbies are likely to prolif-
erate once the single market is in place. Relations between the Community's institu-
tions and interest groups, useful though they may be, must be more clearly defined."
Id.
129. See Grossfeld, supra note 26, at 127. The European Court ofJustice is "a silent
powerhouse in the [Community's] backyard:" See generally WEILER, supra note 5.
130. See van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, Case 26/
62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 12, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105, 129. "The Conclusion to be drawn ... is
that the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of
which the States have limited their rights... [comprising] not only [the] Member States
but also their nationals." Id.; Defrenne v. Sabena, Case 43/75, [1976] E.C.R. 455, [1976]
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sion have no police power to enforce Community law in the
Member States.'-'
One oddity between the' United States and the European
Community is that the right "to say what the law is," that is' the
right of ultimate review, was clearly given to the ECJ by the EEC
treaty, 13 2 whereas the U.S. Supreme Court had to arrogate this
power to itself.'3 3 Conversely; the U.S. Constitution expressly
gives federal law "supremacy" over conflicting state law,13 1
whereas the ECJ had to announce the principle of the "prece-
dence" (supremacy) of Community law in a decision. 35 Both
approaches probably reflect the political realities of the time;
fear of a central government that could override the states (in
the United States); and concern about residual nationalism, on
the part of the Community's Member States (in Europe). Upon
reflection, it seems the outcome could not have been otherwise
in either case, if there was to be any true United States or a Euro-
pean Community.
This "unification" is further cemented by the fact that both
the EC Member States and the subdivisions of the United States,
are committed to the notion that the judgments of their respec-
tive courts should be recognized and enforced in sister state's
courts. This was accomplished in the European Community by
the Member States' uniform assent to the Brussels Convention
2 C.M.L.R. 98. In Defrenne, the European Court held not only that some Community
law was directly effective in Member States, (without transposition into national law)
but that it was also binding upon natural and legal persons and corporations. Id. In
Defrenne, it was equal pay for equal work as between the sexes pursuant to Article 119 of
the EEC Treaty. Id.
131. Grossfeld, supra note 26, at 127.
132. EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 164, 298 U.N.T.S. at 66; Professor Grossfeld
suggests that, with the decision in van Gend en Loos, this created a "preemption-like
principle of law." Grossfeld, supra note 26, at 127-128.
133. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). A decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court, not the Constitution, established the Court's right of judicial
review. Id.
134. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States... and all Treaties-made... under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the... Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Id.
135. Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, [1964] 3 C.M.L.L 425. Accord-
ing to Professor Grossfeld, "[t] he tremendous importance of the supremacy of Commu-
nity law in terms of... economic consequences cannot be overestimated." Grossfeld,
supra note 26, at 129 (citing Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte
Factortame Ltd., Case 213/89, [1990] 1 E.C.R. 2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1).
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on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and
Commercial Matters (1968), although technically this agree-
ment lies outside the Community treaties.136  In the United
States, a similar result was sought through the so-called "Full
Faith and Credit" clause (Article IV, Section 1) of the U.S. Con-
stitution.137 These were signficant concessions made by the sov-
ereign states, and profoundly effected, the "federalization" of
their laws, at least when they are incorporated in judicial opin-
ions. But these concessions were necessary if the states wanted
their transactions and interpretations thereof to have life beyond
their borders. Such a mutual recognition is the very essence of
common market legal regime.
IV. A BRAKE ON FEDERALISM? "NULLIFICATION" IN THE
UNITED STATES AND "SUBSIDIARITY" IN EUROPE
To conclude, let us look at the obverse of "federalism";
namely, the legal prerogatives that might remain with the institu-
tion's constituent states or their citizens. It is true of most fed-
eral unions that their members "federalize" for some purposes,
but not all.
In the case of the United States, the Constitution declared
that the government was formed for certain purposes, albeit
broad ones." 8 If that was not clear enough in the Constitution's
original text, its so-called "reservation amendments" made those
136. See Thieffry, Van Doom and Lowe, supra note 26, 377; Lenaerts, supra note 5,
at 34. Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome takes a similar, although less certain, approach
to the cross-border recognition of certain laws of the Member States by calling for the
.mutual recognition" of companies established under the law of any Member State.
EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 22, 298 U.N.T.S. at 24. The Article also contains a
passage approximating "equal protection", in each Member State, for persons who are
non-nationals, but members of the Community. Id. The Article states that 'Member
States shall . . . enter into negotiations with each other ... so far as is necessary [to
achieve these ends] .. .. " Id. Finally, Article 220 calls for "the simplification of formali-
ties governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement ofjudgements of courts or
tribunals and of arbitration awards [of sister states]" Id. Thus, the passage implicitly
accepts, in treaty language, that there is mutual duty of respect among the EC Member
States for adjudicatory determinations.
137. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738-1739 (1988). The U.S. approach, in the constitutional arti-
cle and the code, is far more direct than the EC approach.
138. See U.S. CoNsT., pmbl. (stating some general goals of U.S. government).
Other goals of the U.S. Constitution are scattered throughout the its text and some of
its Amendments, but the most exact list of federal government "objectives" is found in
Article I, Section 8, describing the legislative powers of Congress. Id. art. I, § 8.
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limits more precise.' 3 9 The same notion was advanced by the
authors of The Federalist.'4 ° Thus, it was contemplated from the
outset in both the European Community and the United States
that there would be a coexistence of state and central govern-
ments. 1 4 1 However, as the difficulties involved in the ratification
of the Maastricht Treaty reveal, people are (and have reason to
be) suspicious of a seemingly open-ended delegation of author-
ity to an ill-defined "central" government. In the United States,
this spawned questions about a state's prerogative to "nullify"
federal legislation that the state felt threatened its well-being,
and whether (in extreme cases) the state could secede from the
Union. The latter issue was one that helped precipitate the
American Civil War.
139. Id. amends. IX, X and XI. The Tenth Amendment is the operative one in
this context. It provides that: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." Id. amend. X. The Eleventh Amendment amends Article III, Section
[2], by providing that a state may not be sued by a citizen of another state in a federal
court (a concession of federal authority back to the states). Id. amend. XI.
140. See THE FEDERAUST No. 45, at 256 (James Madison) (Goldwin Smith ed., rev.
ed., 1901). "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal govern-
ment are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects,
as war, peace, [foreign and interstate] negotiation, and foreign commerce ...." Id. In
No. 12, Alexander Hamilton observes: "[O]ne national government would be able, at
much less expense, to extend the duties on imports... further than would be practica-
ble to the States separately.. .", implying a benefit for all through cooperative action.
Id. No. 12 at 62 (Alexander Hamilton). Finally, a bizarre passage in No. 39 begins:
"The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal
Constitution, but a composition of both." Id. No. 38 at 211 (James Madison).
All these positions were stated, however, before a broad interpretation was given to
the "necessary and proper" clause. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18; McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
The Community Treaties also give its institutions the authority to act in such a way
as to carry into force the goals of the Communities. See EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art.
4, 298 U.N.T.S. at 16 ("The tasks entrusted to the Community shall be carried out by
the... institutions"); Id. art. 5, 298 U.N.T.S. at 17 ("Member states shall take all appro-
priate measures.., to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty");
Id. art. 235, 298 U.N.T.S. at 91 ("If action by the Community should prove necessary to
attain ... one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the
necessary powers, the Council ('legislature') shall [by a process described] ... take the
appropriate measures.") However, the European Court of Justice - unlike the U.S.
Supreme Court - has not been generous in interpreting this clause. See Simmenthal v.
Commission, Case 92/78, [1979] E.C.R. 777, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 25; Meroni Co. v. High
Authority of the ECSC, Case 9/56, [1957-58] E.C.R. 133; Cf Commission v. Council,
Case 22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263, [1971] C.M.L.R. 335.
141. Grossfeld, supra note 26, at 143; Thieffry, Van Doom and Lowe, supra note
26, at 359.
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A. Subsidiarity in the European Community
In Europe, similar reservations about the extent of Member
States' delegation of authority to the Community resulted in per-
sistent - if largely unanswered - questions about "subsidiarity."
This term, and the principle it involves, was finally incorporated
into the "constitutional law" of the Community with the Maas-
tricht Treaty. 14 2 Subsequently, attempts to give it definition were
undertaken at meetings in Birmingham and Edinburgh in late
1992. The "understanding" agreed to at the Edinburgh summit,
kept reluctant constituencies in line, and eventually led to the
ratification of Maastricht's adjusted goals by all Twelve States.
It seems that "nullification" and "subsidiarity," albeit differ-
ent, clearly have a common parent. In extreme circumstances,
both would seem to result in the withdrawal of the offended
state from the union (or secession). The attempt by the confed-
eration of Southern states to secede was punished in the Ameri-
can Civil War, but it seems possible, although unlikely, under the
Community Treaties.
This division of prerogative between state and federal or-
gans of government played a substantial role in U.S. history, and
promises to do so in Europe as well. But that does not mean that
the eventual resolution will be different. In the United States,
the notion manifested itself in the so-called "nullification" de-
bates in the Senate. In Europe, it is exemplified by the principle
of subsidiarity.
Both share a common thesis about the relationship of the
constituent governments to the central government. The essen-
tial difference is that the U.S. central government was allegedly
formed by the people, and given the prerogative to do whatever
was "necessary and proper" to secure its objectives. The Com-
munity institutions were, by contrast, given more limited author-
ity by the constituent Member States,143 and they must vote again
to expand it, as they have done with virtually every new treaty.
The reason must be that the Member States have come to realize
that there is no "bright line" between Community policy and na-
tional policy. Furthermore, they are learning daily that action
taken at the Community (versus the national) level is often more
142. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 116, art. 3b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590.
143. See Sbragia, supra note 3, at 257. Professor Sbragia compares the "territorial
politics" of the United States and Eueopean Community. Id.
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efficient, and has a greater likelihood of success in international
economic circles .
Personally, I do not regard the principle of "subsidiarity" as
originating with the Maastricht agreement.144  After all, the
Community's Member States, in creating a supranational organi-
zation, did not transfer all of their sovereign powers to it.
Rather, they gave it only the authority to act on their collective
behalf to achieve a narrow- set of goals - chiefly economic in
nature. 145 Hence, the Treaty of Rome transferred some power
to Brussels, but reserved much to the Member States. It is no
forced analysis to suggest that this was nearly identical to the no-
tion (expressed in The Federalist) that the U.S. central govern-
ment was one of "limited" and "enumerated" powers.
Member State concern about subsidiarity is likewise evident
in the Single European Act ("SEA"). The SEA is more focused
in its goals than the EEC Treaty. Article 130r clearly states a sub-
sidiarity limitation on "Community... action relating to the en-
vironment .... 14 6 Finally, in response to growing political pres-
sure in some Member States - notably the United Kingdom -
the principle was made express, ironically, in the Maastricht
Treaty.
144. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 116, art. 3b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590. Article 3b
provides:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not
fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in ac-
cordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objec-
tives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community
shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
Id. [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590.
145. See EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 2, 298 U.N.T.S. at 15.
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to pro-
mote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic ac-
tivities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accel-
erated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States
belonging to it.
Id.
146. SEA, supra note 62, art. 130r, 0.J. L 169/1, at 11-12, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 754-
55. The Article states, in relevant part: "The Community shall take action relating to
the environment to the extent to which the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 can be
attained better at Community level than at the level of the individual Member States."
Id.
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If the debate over this principle of reserved rights was not
quite as clear in America, the concept was just as certainly a part
of the establishment of the United States. I suspect it infuses any
federation or confederation of states or governments. It was
surely evident in what we call our "early federal" period.
That was a time during which this country was sorting out
what it really meant to do when setting up a "federal" govern-
ment. What were the somewhat-separate, but coexistent, powers
granted to or retained by citizens, the states, and the central gov-
ernment? This process of definition and redefinition was not an
easy or painless task. Establishing central institutions to advance
certain collective goals of its members is conceptually easy, but
the difficulty is surely in the details.
The European Community is also in a state of flux some
thirty years after its formation. What responsibility for decision-
making was retained by Member States, what delegated to Com-
munity institutions? This tension is inherent in a situation in
which Member States are asked to allow a supranational organi-
zation to aggrandize its power, potentially at their expense.
The subsidiarity concept is easily defined, although poten-
tially difficult to apply. Simply put, it requires that regulatory
decisions be taken at the lowest effective level. Goals that cannot
be achieved by Member States, acting on their own, should be
handled by the Community. The concept was particularly pro-
moted by the United Kingdom and Denmark, nations that have
been openly critical of European unification in general.1 47
Thus, the "subsidiarity" principle would preserve the decision-
making integrity of the Member States, with regard to their own
local affairs, and prevent the Community from encroaching on
areas more properly the prerogative of the constituent states.
There should be little problem with this division of labor
when the authority to regulate has been delegated exclusively to
the Community (for example, cross-border restrictions on
trade); or clearly remains within the sovereign prerogatives of
the states, albeit narrowly construed." But in areas in which
147. EUROPEAN UNTY; Passport Deadline Highlights Political Differences, DALL.
MoRN. NEWS, Nov. 26, 1992, at 30A.
148. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 116, art. 3b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590. Article 3b
expressly excepts from the subsidiarity principle "areas which ... fall within the [Com-
munity's] exclusive competence .... " Id. [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590. However, Member
States are given the specific right to derogate from Community "law" if "justified on
1994]
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there appears to be a shared authority to regulate, the applica-
tion of the principle of subsidiarity becomes diffuse and hotly
debated.
It is also in these situations that the choice made -
whatever it maybe - is essentially political; there being no clear
legal guidelines (at least not in the treaty) to inform the deci-
sionmaker, or whomever reviews the decision, regarding its le-
gality. 149 Thus, although the British Prime Minister,John Major,
presiding as Council President during the last six-months pre-
ceding December 31, 1992, wrangled some concessions from
Brussels at the intergovernmental conference at Birmingham
and summit at Edinburgh, what after all did he win?15 ° The sub-
sidiarity "agreement" merely provided that the Community
"would only act when its member states agreed that it should do
so." 15  This decision is to be made, initially, by the Council,
which, in effect, has made the decision all along.
There are some vague standards'by which to evaluate the
Council's judgment. "[T] he Community shall take action ...
only if ... the proposed action cannot be .. .achieved by the
grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health
and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures ... or the
protection of industrial and commercial property." EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 36,
298 U.N.T.S. at 29; see, e.g., Regina v. Thompson, Case 7/78, [1978] E.C.R. 2247, [1979]
1 C.M.L.R. 47; cf. Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, Joined Cases 286/82 and
26/83, (1984] E.C.R. 377, [1985) 3 C.M.L.R. 57. Similar, more limited, derogations are
addressed in EEC Articles 56, 73 and 226, in situations where the issue is of such impor-
tance to the state, or so immediate, or threatens such serious disruption, that Commu-
nity interests must give way (at least temporarily) to an individual Member State's inter-
est. EEC Treaty, supra note 22, arts. 56, 73, and 226, 298 U.N.T.S. at 39, 44, 89.
149. Hartley, supra note 119, 214-18.
150. Andrew Hill, The Edinburgh Summit: The S Word: Teach Yourself Summit-Speak,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at 3.
151. John Roberts, Europe: Subsidiarity Issue Settled at Last, Or Is It?, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Dec. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File; see Maastricht
Treaty, supra note 116, art 3b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590 (defining subsidiarity); see also,
Simon Alterman, Summit Eases EC Crisis, but Major's Agony Centre Stage, THE REUTER EUR.
COMM'Y REP., Oct. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File; Michael
White, UK: Major - Little Joy for Wary Tory Rightwingers in Declaration, REUTER TEXTLINE
GuARDAN, Oct. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD File.
See Sir Leon Brittan, EC: Europe Documents; No 1786 -Subsidiarity in the Constitution of
the European Community, REUTER TEXTINE AGENCE EUROPE, June 18, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, WORLD File. Speaking at the European University Institute in
Florence, Italy on November 6, 1992, Vice-President of the European Commission, Sir
Leon Brittan, described the "proposed" Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty in virtually
the identical terms that were contained in the original draft, signed in Maastricht in
February, 1992. Id.
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Member States [acting individually] ... by reason of [its] scale or
effects .... 15 This section also states that "[t]he Community
shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it .... "
But there is nothing "new" about the latter, and the former only
suggests that the Community ought not to exercise its shared
authority if there is no need for a common policy. This seems
implicit - if not explicit - in the Treaty of Rome. Moreover,
an Advocate General of the ECJ expressed his belief that the
Treaty provided enough guidance to enable the Court to apply
the subsidiarity principle in cases that will inevitably come before
it.153 If the standard proves too vague, the issue will be nonjusti-
ciable, of course, and the Member States' Council representa-
tives will have to give the subsidiarity principle a more compre-
hensive legal definition. I doubt that this will happen. First,
those representatives have probably given the best definition
possible at this point in time, and the ECJ has successfully
helped the Community to bridge its differences many times in
the past.
So what was gained by all of the hesitation and hand wring-
ing seems to be process, and not necessarily substance; simply an
increased "sensitivity" to Member States' economic and political
interests.1 54 Perhaps it will slow the pace of European integra-
tion, which may be all the Euro-sceptics expected anyway.' 55
Hence, whether overt recognition of the subsidiarity princi-
ple ultimately acts as a "brake" on the pace of Community "fed-
eralization" (as the wording of Maastricht Article 3b implies, 56
and its proponents intend), or whether the perceived need for
Community action will turn it into an "accelerator" instead
(which seems to be an entirely permissible interpretation of the
152. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 116, art. 3b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590.
153. Claus Gulmann, Advocat-General of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, in remarks to the Trier Academy of European Law's Conference, The
Future of Europe - Centralized and Decentralized Approaches, October 7, 1993, Trier, Ger-
many (Trier Academy, forthcoming Spring 1994) (notes on file with author).
154. Hartley, supra note 119, at 216-17.
155. See Commission's 1992 Programme, supra note 75, at 39. Although I have not
made a careful study of it, the term "subsidiarity" is not one that occurs very frequently,
if at all, in the speeches of Jacques Delors or the Commission's Programme presenta-
tions to the European Parliament from the latter 1980's through 1991. However, these
presentations in February 1992, are replete with mention of the term (e.g., "In accord-
ance with the subsidiarity principle, strongly endorsed by the Heads of State or Govern-
ment and by the Commission itself... ."). Id.
156. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 116, art 3b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590.
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article), can only be imagined. In the short term, I think it will
probably act as a brake. In the longer term, however, it could
just as easily act as an accelerator, for the reasons discussed be-
low.
B. Nullification in the United States
A similar debate took place in the United States. It began
before the ratification of the Constitution and lasted at least un-
til the end of the American Civil War, although in minor ways it
continues today. 15 7 The early debate (concerning the principles
of "nullification" and "secession"), often focused on the federal
role, if any, in abolishing slavery; the admission to the Union of
so-called "free" and "slave" states in equal numbers (in order to
maintain the voting balance in the Senate); and the imposition
of federal taxes, the revenue from which might be used to im-
pose federal law in the slave states or even to subdue them.158
Euro-sceptics can find some parallels, but given the outcome,
not much solace, in the American experience.
The "nullification" position of South Carolina (and certain
other southern states), was advocated by Senator Hayne.' 5 9 In
his view,
the powers of the federal government.., resulting from the
compact to which the States are parties (the Constitution) [is]
limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument...
[and is] no farther valid than ... authorized by the grants
enumerated in that compact .... [I]n case of a deliberate,
palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers not
granted by the said compact, the States who are parties
thereto have the right... to interpose [in order to maintain
their] authorities, rights, and liberties .... 160
This sounds familiar, if a bit extreme, to students of the "sub-
sidiarity" principle.
Senator Daniel Webster's (MA) rejoinder was sometimes re-
sponsive, but not always so. In Webster's view,
The great question is, Whose prerogative is it to decide the
157. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
158. MAURICE G. BAXTER, DANIEL WEBSTER & THE SUPREME COURT 239-40 (1966).
159. EDWIN P. WHIPPLE, THE GREAT SPEECHES AND ORATIONS OF DANIEL WEBSTER
256 (Gryphon 1989) (1894).
160. Id.
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constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the laws? . . . I do
not admit, that, under the Constitution and in conformity
with it, there is any mode in which a State government, as a
member of the Union, can interfere and stop the progress of
the general government, by force of [the State's] own laws,
under any circumstances whatever. This leads us to inquire
into the origin of [the federal] government and the source of
its power. Whose agent is it?... The people of the United
States have declared that [the] Constitution shall be the
supreme law. We must either admit [this] proposition, or dis-
pute their authority. The States are, unquestionably, sover-
eign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected by this supreme
law... [T] he general government and the State governments
derive their authority from the same source [the people]."161
It is fairly odd that this debate should have occurred at all in
1830, eleven years after a U.S. Supreme Court opinion appeared
to have settled the issue in favor of the people. 6 '
Even if the people (and not the states) formed the U.S.
Constitution and union, however, this is not true of the Euro-
pean Community. In the Community, the individual Member
States, and not their peoples, are, the "high contracting par-
ties." 163 Nonetheless, in both situations it is evident that, if the
legislative authority (or the requisite majority of it) could muster
the will, then an Amendment could be adopted, or a Treaty
signed and ratified, or legislation passed, that would allow more
authority to pass to the central government; or possibly flow
back to the people and/or the states.164 In general, the latter
did not happen in the United States, although the exact line
between state and federal prerogative is constantly being
redrawn in our courts and legislatures. Neither has this hap-
pened for the most part in the European Community - despite
the conciliatory language in various "subsidiarity" pronounce-
ments - except at the very margins of authority. 165
161. Id. at 256-57.
162. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that federal
government may have implied authority to act where "necessary and proper" to achieve
goals assigned it in the U.S. Constitution). BAXTER, supra note 158, at 240; THE FEDER-
AusT No. 31 (Alexander Hamilton).
163. Cmpare U.S. CONST., pmbl. with EEC Treaty, supra note 22, pmbl., 298
U.N.T.S. at 14.
164. See supra notes 13841 and accompanying text (discussing recognition that
U.S. government was formed for certain broad, but limited purposes).
165. See Written Question OJ. C/261 (1991) (concerning zoo directive). The
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Ambiguity about these matters cannot persist forever. Ac-
cording to Senator Webster, "[o]ne of two things is true; either
the laws of the Union are beyond the discretion and... control
of the States; or else we have no constitution of general govern-
ment, and are thrust back again to the days of the [Articles of]
Confederation." 66 Senator Webster further stated, "[t] he peo-
ple had . .. quite enough of that kind of Government ....
Under that system, the legal action... belonged exclusively to
the States. [Congress'] ... acts were not of binding force, till the
States had adopted and sanctioned them."1 67
To correct this lack of inertia, the Constitution took two de-
finitive steps, Webster said. First, it declared "the Constitution,
and the laws of the United States... [to] be the Supreme law of
the land .... ,,6 8 Second, it declared "that the [federal] judicial
power shall extend to all cases arising under the Constitution
and laws of the United States." 169 These principles, he said,
"cover the whole ground. They are . . . the keystone of the
arch!"' The situation is really not so different in the Commu-
nity.
Thus, as early as 1830, Senator Webster concluded that the
federal government "is as popular, just as truly emanating from
the people, as the State governments. It is created for one pur-
pose; the State governments for another. It has its own powers;
they have theirs."'7 ' The principles emphasized by Senator Web-
ster in this statement should sound familiar to students of the
subsidiarity.
Commission's proposed zoo directive, was probably an overreaching attempt to
uniformize Community law. It has since been reconsidered. See EP Debates Maastricht
Provisions, THE REuTER EUR. COMM'Y REP., Sept. 16, 1993.
166. See WHIPPLE, supra note 159, at 263.
167. Id. at 265.
168. Id. at 265 (referencing U.S. CONST., art. VI § 2); cf. van Gend & Loos, [1963]
E.C.R. 1, 2, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105("the European Economic Community constitutes a
new legal order ... for the benefit of which the [Member] states have limited their
sovereign rights .. . ."); Costa v. EVEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 586, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425
("[t] he law stemming from the [EEC] Treaty... could not ... be overriden by domestic
legal provisions (member state law), however framed . . ").
169. WHiPPLE, supra note 159, at 265 (referring to U.S. CONST., art III § 2[1]); cf
EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 164, 298 U.N.T.S. at 73 ("[t]he [European] Court of
Justice [apparently has the exclusive power (when read together with Article 177) to]
ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed.").
170. WHIPPLE, supra note 159, at 265.
171. Id. at 264.
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Webster claimed that his interpretation concerning the allo-
cation to the central government of "strictly limited powers; of
enumerated, specified, and particularized powers" had to be the
proper one. He asked, "could anything ... [be] more preposter-
ous, than to make a government for the whole Union, and yet
leave its powers subject, not to one interpretation, but to thir-
teen or twenty-four interpretations?" Webster called this not a
Constitution, or government, but a "[topic] for everlasting con-
troversy."17
2
In the nullification debates a wide range of views was ex-
pressed concerning the boundary between state and federal
powers. Senator Calhoun (KY) went so far as to espouse a prin-
ciple of "concurrent (state and federal) majority,"173 which dis-
tantly resembles the Luxembourg Accords, 174 or the treaty con-
cessions granted to Denmark and the United Kingdom at Edin-
burgh.' 75 Senator Webster rejoined that, since the States did not
form the union, they did not possess the authority to nullify fed-
eral acts or to secede. If the states sought to do so, it would be
revolution (robbing the central government of its authority,
granted to it by the people), and the states would have to be
forcibly restrained.'
76
There is some historical support for both Webster's and
Hayne's points of view. At the time of the debate, the American
states were used to doing a considerable amount of the work of
government, when compared to the present. Moreover, the
Constitution's Tenth Amendment reserved "undelegated pow-
ers" to the States (or people), and Article IV, section 2 spoke in
terms of "Citizens of each State." But, in the end, Webster's posi-
172. Id. at 266. There were 24 States in the Union at the time of the speech. Cf.
Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585,594, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425,455 ("The executive force of
the Community law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to subsequent
domestic laws, without jeopardising the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty
173. WHIPPLE, supra note 159, at 266.
174. Luxembourg Accords, 3 E.C. BuLL., at 8 (1966).
175. Alan Riding, Europeans Try to Revive a Faded Dream of Unity, N.Y. TIMES, June
20, 1993, at 8. Denmark was allowed to opt-out of the provisions for a single currency,
European' citizenship and common defense policy. Marc Fisher, Now Europe Faces
Toughest Test: Unifying Amid Hard Times, WASH. POST, May 20, 1993, at A26. The UK was
granted the option of opting-out of the single currency provision as well. Riding, supra,
at 8.
176. See MAURiCE G. BAXTER, ONE AND INSEPARABLE: DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE
UNION 209-13 (1984) (discussing nullification).
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tion triumphed, for it was the only practical approach.' , It is
worth noting, however, that Calhoun gained some "concrete
concessions" on the tariff bill that precipitated the debate.17 8
Perhaps the Euro-sceptics have something similar in mind.
Ultimately, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution clarified the relationship of persons to both the state and
federal governments, and gave the people substantial protec-
tions and entitlements vis i vis both governments. 79 But this was
not until 1868, nearly eighty years after the Constitution was
drafted. Today the U.S. Constitution and the state constitutions
are important sources of rights and guarantees for Americans,
the latter being subordinate to the former.
. Hence, there are important similarities between the United
States and the European Communities, but they should not be
drawn too tightly. As previously stated, the Community was
formed by the constituent Member States and not by their citi-
zens (although this distinction may blur somewhat if the Euro-
pean Parliament becomes more democratic and is given a larger
- perhaps decisive - role in Community legislation). Presi-
dent Delors has suggested that the Community will not be com-
plete until there is a "European citizens' charter." °80 His pre-
scription suggests "rights" that come more or less directly from
the Community, rather than from the constituent Member
States; rights that are based on EC "citizenship," not national cit-
izenship.
However, the Community treaties do confer important
"rights" on Community "citizens."'' But most Europeans do not
regard these "Community" guarantees quite as seriously as their
177. Id. at 214-17.
178. Id. at 218-20.
179. See U.S. CoNST., amend. XIV § 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... ." Id.
180. Commission's 1992 Programme, supra note 75, at 42. "The set of proposals
forming the action programme to implement the Community Charter of the Funda-
mental Social Rights of Workers is almost complete. Rapid adoption will make it possi-
ble to lay the foundations for the social dimension of the single market...." Id. at 42.
"In the social field, the Maastricht agreement opens up the way to an enhancement of
the Community's social dimension involving consolidation of the foundation formed by
the Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers .... ." Id. at 30.
181. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 48, 298 U.N.T.S. at 36 (guaranteeing
free movement of workers):
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national guarantees, which seem closer at hand and easier to in-
fluence politically.
A similar attitude once prevailed in the United States, but
dissipated over time. The European attitude is already softening
(at least during prosperous times), and the process may be ad-
vanced by formal agreements such as one contained in the Maas-
tricht Treaty. That section provides that "the protection of the
rights and interests of the nationals of [EC] Member States" will
be strengthened and protected "through the introduction of
[the concept of] ... citizenship of the Union."8 2
Second, while it seems evident that a Member State can
leave the Community (Greenland did so, amicably, in 1979) ,183 it
does not seem likely that any additional states will do so. Indeed,
present members are likely to be placed under enormous polit-
ical (and litigation) pressure, to remain within the Community
and conform to its rules.'8 4 Concessions, such as those sought
and obtained by Denmark and the United Kingdom in order to
expedite ratification of the Maastricht agreement, may be the
short-term price the Community has to pay to keep its "ever
closer union" progressing on track.8 5 Commission President
Delors suggested that these concessions were made because of
182. See Maastrict Treaty, supra note 116,'airt. B, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727 (setting
out third "objective" of European Union); see id. art. G, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 729
(amending Article 8 of EEC Treaty). The amended version of Article B states:
1.. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established.
Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen
of the Union.
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and
shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby.
Maastricht Treaty, supra note 116, art. 8, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 593.
183. Werner F. Ebke, Enforcement Techniques within the European Communities: Flying
Close to the Sun with Waxen Wings, 50 J. AIR L. & CoM. 685, 686 n.2 (1985).
184. See EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 5, 298 U.N.T.S. at 17. "Member States shall
take all appropriate measures... to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of
this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community." Id.
Article 169 provides, in relevant part: "If the Commission considers that a Member State
has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty, it ... may bring the matter before
the [European] Court ofJustice." (after certain procedures are followed). Id. art. 169,
298 U.N.T.S. at 75. Article 170 provides a similar course of action for fellow Member
States. Id. art. 170, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75. There is at least "moral" force here, if the
precise remedy is left intentionally vague. See id. arts. 187, 192, 298 U.N.T.S. at 78-79.
185. See Commission's 1993-94 programme, supra note 96, at 16. According to the
Commission's work programme for 1993-94, the disagreements surrounding the ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht Treaty resulted in the Community's image being "tarnished in
1992." Id.
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these two countries' long service to the Community. He said
that the Community would not make similar concessions to new
members over whom the Community will enjoy greater initial
leverage.'1 6 Indeed, it would seem progressively more difficult
for any individual Members State to get concessions if the Com-
munity becomes more ,unified and increases in size. At some
point, such a "variable-geometry Europe,"'1 7 if it ever happens,
will be no "Community" at all.
Finally, it is clear that, whereas the nullification and seces-
sion doctrines were to be exercised by individual States acting
unilaterally (according to their perceived self-interest), a judg-
ment about subsidiarity is, at present, a collective one made by
the Community itself. While concern about the subsidiarity
principle will undoubtedly influence the Commission's legisla-
tive initiative,' 88 the limits on Community or Member State pre-
rogative are chiefly set by the Council, together with the Com-
mission and Parliament. Thus, they are beyond the authority of
a single Member State to declare, except where unanimous ac-
tion is required, or secession is the route pursued. The very in-
stitutions charged with making certain the Community achieves
its collective goals, are charged with making the final "call" with
regard to what lies within the Community authority, and what
falls to the Member States. It is a little like the "necessary and
proper" prerogative of Congress, 189 if approved by the President
and upheld by the courts. Of course, an individual Member
State may claim a derogation from Community legislation,
rather than seeking a concession from other Member States or
seceding, but derogations are not easy to obtain and are nar-
rowly construed by the European Court. 90
186. David Gardner, Difficult Recipe for a Bigger Cake: The First Round of EC Enlarge-
ment Talks Was Successful, but the Hard Bargaining is Just Beginning, FIN. TIMES, June 11,
1993, at 13.
187. Delors Address, supra note 82, at 10.
188. Commission's 1992 Programme, supra note 75, at 39. "In accordance with
the subsidiarity principle, strongly endorsed by the... Commission itself at Maastricht,
the Commission will continue to resist over-legislation and intervention in areas which
can be properly dealt with at [the] national, regional or local level...." Id.; see Conlcu-
sions of the Presidency, supra note 90, Annex 2 to Part A, at 4-5 (concerning withdrawal
of Commission proposals regarding "conditions in which animals are kept in zoos" and
"labeling of shoes").
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
190. See, e.g. EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 36, 298 U.N.T.S. at 29. Article 36
contains the terms of derogation from Community "legislation" covering quantitative
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It is quite evident to the Member States, I suspect, that the
ultimate consequence of a "single" market in, for example, utili-
ties or transport or telecommunications (put aside military pro-
curement), is the standardization of demand behind the most
cost-effective products or services. In the short term, this means
an inevitable loss of businesses and jobs in some Member States,
as the market gravitates toward the best supplier or suppliers.
On the other hand, this shake-out is likely to produce better
market competitors, and greater cost-efficiency, in the longer
term. The largest single concern is whether the States can adjust
to the standardization (and possible loss) of what are frequently
considered indispensable national services - telecommunica-
tions, power and transport - to another Member-State supplier.
It will not be an easy adjustment, but no doubt the American
colonies once had similar concerns, before they overcame them
in the interest of greater security, including a diverse national
market. Of course, this assumes that European companies can
capitalize on that market, and not loose significant portions of it
to U.S. andJapanese competitors.' 91 However, a nationalistic ap-
proach to the management of the European market will do little
to forestall this.
C. A Two-Edged Sword
Hence, it should be obvious that "subsidiarity" is a two-
edged sword. It can cut against Community action, but can also
cut against state prerogatives. There is no "bright line" of de-
marcation between the two. It is as true of Community law as it
is of U.S. "federal" law that one area of regulatory concern
merges almost imperceptively into another. 92 How, for exam-
ple, would one describe the scope of "Commerce... among the
several States," that Congress has a right to "regulate?"'
restrictions on trade between Member States. Id.; seeYvonne van Duyn v. Home Office,
Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1; Roland Rutili v. Minister of the
Interior, Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 140.
191. U.S. in Surprise [Telecommunications] Deal with Germany, BosTON GLOBE, June
11, 1993, at 60.
192. See Thieffry, Van Doom and Lowe, supra note 26, at 374. "The area of social
law [not far advanced in the Community] ... has important implications for business
[the Community's main thrust] .... " Id.
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Historically, the "commerce power "194 has been a very fluid
one, which grew and shrank (mostly grew) with the felt needs of
the times. So too in the European Community, where the free
movement of workers and the right of establishment gradually
merge into the right to equal treatment within a workforce, then
into unemployment entitlements, and finally welfare rights.'9 5
The line that delimits the Community's authority as policy-
maker and regulator may be drawn at different points with re-
gard to different policy areas (for example, cross-border transit
of commercial goods versus social policy), or it may be drawn at
different places within the same regime of regulation '(as for ex-
ample, Community authority to set pollution standards for bath-
ing beaches, but not to select the beaches to which the standard
is.applied). 196 When compared to the United States, the social
program of the Community is very much in its infancy.'97 But
the program in the United States is largely a product of the twen-
tieth century.
It is clear from the wording of Article 189(c) of the Maas-
tricht Treaty"9 ' that the European Council (or, in most cases, a
qualified majority of it) generally sets the Community's legisla-
tive limits, based on material put before it by the Commission,
194. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964) (interpreting, expansively, Congress' right to regulate commerce).
195. Burton v. British Railways Board, Case. 19/81, [1982] E.C.R. 555, [1982] 2
C.M.L.R. 136; Francovich & Bonafaci v. Italy, Cases 6/90 & 9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357,
[1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 66.
196. Europe Information Service, Subsidiarity: Commission Report Due Out Soon, in
EUR. ENV'T, July 28, 1992, at § 392,
197. Delors Address, supra note 82, at 9.
[Wiorkers have the impression that 'social Europe' is a mirage. I sympathize
with them, as redundancies multiply and the Social Charter remains a pious
aspiration. But the Commission is not discouraged .... For the Commission
... the issue is not an ideological one. The social dimension is... an integral
part of the European venture .... [T]here will be a credibility problem until
the Council stops prevaricating and gives concrete expression to the spirit of
the Social Charter.
Id.
But see Hartley, supra note 119, at 218-20 (noting that EEC Treaty and Community
legislation only grant right of free movement to specific groups of people, impeding
peoples self-identification as citizens of the EEC); Hilton, supra note 102, at 24 (noting
that EEC has not created a body of rights to serve as a "foundation of loyalty to, and
identification with, the EC by its citizens.").
198. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 116, art. 189(c), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 696
(amending Community "procedure" governing "the adoption of a [Community] act"
under the Treaty).
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after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament. The
Commission and/or Parliament may take a' conservative posture
with regard to the subsidiarity principle, but that seems unlikely.
They are, with the Court, the most "Europeanized" of the Com-
munity institutions. Thus, the "subsidiarity" judgment is ulti-
mately left to a qualified majority of the Council, under substan-
tial pressure from the Commission and Parliament, in a new "co-
decisional" process, 99 to support Community legislation, when-
ever the legislative prerogative has proceeded this far.
The Court of Justice is empowered to review the Council's
decision, based on a "lack of competence" ,or "infringement" of
the Treaty or Community law.2 0 However, this is not materially
different from the system that existed before the Birmingham
agreement and Edinburgh summit. The ECJ has always held the
Commission and Council to a fairly-high standard with regard to
treaty competencies. 20 1 Thus, the principle of "subsidiarity" has
always implied a limit on Community power; just as the "neces-
sary and proper" clause of the U.S. Constitution constitutes a
flexible restraint on legislative prerogative. °2 In the same way,
Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome implies a reservoir of "neces-
sary" power "to attain . . . the objectives of the Community
.... "203 All that is needed is the cooperation of the institutions,
the same as in the United States. 204
199. See id. art. 189(c), (d), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 696; see also Hartley* supra note
119, at 221-26 (explaining differences between older "cooperation" procedure, and new
"co-decision" processes); Delors Address, supra note 82, at 11 (recognizing the impor-
tance of this institutional "breakthrough" and its likely impact on democratization of
the Community); Commission's 1993-94 programme, supra note 96, at 22-23.
200. See generaly EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76 (con-
cerning bases for European Court review of Commission or Council action based on
Member State action).
201. See generally Meroni v. ECSC High Authority, Case 9/56, [1957-58] E.C.R. 133;
Cf Commission v. Council, Case 45/86, [1987] E.C.R. 1493, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 131 (re-
garding generalized tariff preferences); cf. Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, [1971]
E.C.R. 263, [1971] C.M.LR. 335 (regarding European Road Transport Agreement).
202. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. That passage of the Constitution gives Congress
"Power... [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers [conferred on Congress by the Section], and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States... ." Id.
Does this passage suggest to you where the "line be drawn" between the preroga-
tives of the central government and those "reserved" to the States of people? See U.S. v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
203. EEC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 235, 298 U.N.T.S. at 91.
204. See Hartley, supra note 119, 214-18 (discussing principle of subsidiarity in EC
law).
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At bottom, then, the subsidiarity principle is as much a
political doctrine as it is a legal or legislative one. In the past,
the ECJ has insisted that the Community demonstrate a precise
competency in order to act. But it could, in the future, conclude
that action is best taken at the Community level, according to
the principle of subsidiarity, whenever the Commission, Parlia-
ment, and Council so agree. That is to say, except in obvious
cases, the judgment of the Council on this largely-political issue,
is as good as the judgment of the Court. Unless "subsidiarity"
advocates achieve critical mass in Council deliberations, the re-
maining representatives are free to favor Community action.
The ECJ is not likely to object frequently to what will often be a
largely-standardless choice.
The Maastricht Treaty, and current political and economic
events in Europe, have focused a spotlight on. the principle of
subsidiarity. In its glare, some concessions have been wrung
from the Commission in particular. In the near term at least, it
is likely to be quite circumspect about the proposals it puts
before the Council, and to be well-prepared to defend its sugges-
tion that the Community act collectively. This might throttle
some marginal regulations or directives, and delay others. But,
at the end of the day, it amounts chiefly to process, not sub-
stance.
If, in the longer term, an economic upturn in Europe and
the transparency of the subsidiarity process convinces Commu-
nity citizens that they have more to hope for - and less to fear
- from Brussels than they think, then subsidiarity will have cut
in just the opposite direction that its advocates hoped.
CONCLUSION: IT TAKES TIME
My point here is that cooperation in the world economic
environment, with the goal of greater competitive success, leads
economic units toward a greater degree of union. The persis-
tent myth that America's federal "union" sprang full blown from
the Constitution, like Athena from the head of Zeus, is not accu-
rate.20 5 It took a Civil War, an industrial revolution, a severe de-
205. See generally MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789, at 125-28, 194-233 (reviewing economic
and trading relationships of American colonies with European nations and among
themselves).
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pression, two World Wars, and much more for true "federalism"
to creep thoroughly into the fabric of American Constitutional
government.
By that yardstick, the European Community is very young
indeed. Moreover, the "federalizing" process in America is still
not complete. It goes on daily in small ways. As it flows, so can it
ebb, but the general tendency is toward the former. As the econ-
omy grows, a closer union seems inevitable* and inexorable.
The sheer inefficiency of having to produce a near-uniform
"Community" law by means of directives that, in most cases, must
be transposed into national law, is daunting when compared to
the effective fiat of federal law in the United States. There is the
delay involved in the transposition of Community directives; the
need for the Commission to track the progress thereof; the pos-
sible need to prod - even sue - Member States to insure that
the process is complete, accurate, and timely; and private suits
may follow thereafter. Meanwhile, there exists political, eco-
nomic, and legal "wiggle room" that the States may favor, but the
Community can ill afford.
This approach suggests that Member States have not yet
reached a "comfort level" that will allow for a greater degree of
direct regulation from Brussels (essentially by returning to regu-
lations as a legislative device).26 That time, however, must even-
tually come. And there is no doubt whatever that the Member
States have already accepted the "principle of federal law, uni-
formly imposed, for that is the impact of any Treaty passage or
directive that has "direct effect,"20 7 and of the decisions of the
ECJ. So we are not debating here the principle of a loss of sover-
eignty, but only about the degree thereof. As was the case in the
United States, it takes a little time to get used to it.
As one newspaper reported during the Maastricht Treaty
negotiations: "The [Intergovernmental Conference] on political
union represents a great opportunity not so much to turn the
EC into a federation as to give the present [one] a satisfactory
constitution. "208 Another article commented on the British insis-
206. See Sbragia, supra note 3, at 257 (discussing future of "federalism" in EEC).
207. See van Gend & Loos, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105 (stat-
ing that Treaty provisions that are clear and unconditional have direct effect and create
"individual rights which national courts must protect").
208. A Vision of Europe, FIN. TIMES, June 19, 1991, at 20. "Notwithstanding Mr.
Douglas Hurd's protestations and Mrs. Margaret Thatcher's wailing, the European
1994]
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tence that references to "federalism" be removed from the draft.
It read: "For most EC [Member State] governments... the word
'federalism' has become a routine, almost banal, part of their
Euro-rhetoric." °9 Indeed, a new generation of "Europeans," far
less national in its outlook than prior generations, is already
poised to assume a larger leadership role in the respective states.
When they do, federalization might move forward quite quickly
indeed.210
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., of the U.S. Supreme
Court, put it:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time.., have.., a good deal more
to do than . . . syllogism in determining the rules by which
men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a
[political unit's] development [over time] . . . . In order to
know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it
tends to become .... The substance of the law at any given
time pretty nearly corresponds ... [to] what is then under-
stood to be convenient .... 21
I do not think there is much doubt - for those who look
back objectively over the history of the Communities - about
what they were and what they are tending to become. A growing
degree of "federalism" - if not "sweet" - may be inevitable;
indeed necessary, if the Community is to succeed.
Community is already a federation. Unfortunately, it is one with an unsatisfactory con-
stitution." Id.
209. David Buchan, Federalism May Become the Non-Word of Euro-rhetoric, FIN. TIMES,
June 19, 1991, at 2.
210. Grossfeld, supra note 26, at 144. "We do not have to worry about how all this
will happen. Young lawyers trained with and in European norms will see their chances
... . They will stream to the European sources as eagerly as their predecessors
streamed to Bologna and Padua .... Europe is our only chance for a stable peace." Id.
211. OLIVER W. HoLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (Leslie B. Adams, Jr., 1982)
(1881).
